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ANTITRUST IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS:
APPLICATIONS
JOHN M. NEWMAN*
ABSTRACT
"Free" products have exploded in popularity along with widespread
Internet adoption-but many of them are not truly free. Customers often
trade their attention or personal information to access zero-price
products. This exchange dynamic brings zero-price markets within the
scope of antitrust law. But despite the critical role that such markets now
play in modern economies, the antitrust enterprise has largely failed to
account for their unique attributes.
In response, this Article undertakes two primary tasks. The first is to
address particular areas of current antitrust doctrine that require revision
or reinterpretation in the face of zero prices. Topics addressed include
consumer standing (can attention or personal information qualify as
"property" under the Clayton Act?), market definition (is the SSNIP-
based hypothetical-monopolist test still workable?), market power (can the
traditional emphasis on "power to control price" be refocused on more
relevant modes of competition?), defenses (is there a viable 'free goods"
defense?), and damages (can attentional or informational harms be
quantified with the requisite degree of accuracy?).
The second task is to examine applications of antitrust law to
particular types of strategic conduct. Toward this end, the Article surveys
and critiques the existing antitrust case law involving zero-price markets.
Though this analysis reveals some flawed judicial reasoning, it also
identifies an encouraging trend toward honest attempts to grapple with the
distinctive difficulties posed by zero-price markets.
* Assistant Professor, University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. A portion
of this draft was written while the author was practicing as a Trial Attorney with the U.S. Department
of Justice, Antitrust Division. The views expressed herein are solely the author's and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice. Any discussions of matters in which the author
represented the United States reflect solely information gathered from public sources and do not
reveal, relate to, or draw upon confidential information. Many thanks for their comments on various
drafts of this paper are due to Herbert Hovenkamp, Gregory J. Werden, William Kratzke, Boris
Mamlyuk, Jens Prfifer, Peter Swire, Leah McCoy, Susan Musser, and Damon C. Andrews. Thanks also
to Devon C. Muse and Gale B. Robinson, Jr., for providing excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Free" products have exploded in popularity. Though often labeled as
such, many of these products are not free.' Social networks, web-based
email, radio, television programs, news services, mapping programs,
online search-all are now widely offered to customers with no prices
attached. Yet many providers of these products are not acting
altruistically; in fact, zero-price products have grown so profitable that
their suppliers boast a combined market capitalization of well over $1
trillion.2 Customers are exchanging something of value-most commonly
their attention to advertisements or their personal information-in order to
access zero-price products.3
But despite the critical role that zero-price products now play in
modem economies, analysts have failed to adequately account for the
unique attributes of zero-price markets, leaving the antitrust enterprise
woefully unprepared to play its traditional role of safeguarding
marketplace competition. This failure has already caused substantial harm
to consumer welfare; left unchecked, it will continue to do so.
This Article seeks to address that failure. The choice of title was
deliberate: to call zero-price products "free" is to beg the question. The
discussion that follows builds on the fundamental observation that "free"
products often are not free.4 Zero-price markets are a part-and, afortiori,
an increasingly vital part-of the "trade or commerce" Congress intended
to regulate under the antitrust laws. Yet, antitrust institutions are, at best,
only beginning to wrestle with the unique issues presented by zero-price
transactions.
1. In common usage, "free" denotes zero cost. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2001) ("[W]henever one says a
resource is 'free,' most believe that a price is being quoted-free, that is, as in zero cost.").
2. See, e.g., Market Capitalization of the Largest U.S. Internet Companies as of March 2016,
STATISTICA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/20933 1/largest-us-internet-companies-by-market-cap/
(last visited June 2, 2016). Of the ten largest Internet companies listed, seven offered primarily or
exclusively zero-price products-and these seven firms alone accounted for over $950 billion in
market capitalization.
3. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 149,
165-72 (2015).
4. Some zero-price products are truly free (or as close to free as is realistically possible)-for
example, nonprofit organizations like the Wikimedia Foundation provide online services free of
charge. See generally Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods:
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement 8 (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 14-
44, 2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2529425 (explaining that an array of
charitable, social, reputational, and even selfish motives underlie truly free product offerings).
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Part II of this Article identifies and addresses several foundational
aspects of the antitrust enterprise that are challenged by zero-prices. It
begins by establishing that consumers of zero-price products may have
standing to sue under the Clayton Act, which requires injury to a
",5plaintiffs "business or property. The primary argument here is
descriptive (though likely not uncontroversial); it employs textual,
precedential, and purposive tools of analysis to conclude that, for the
narrow purposes of Clayton Act standing, "property" includes information
and attention. As a corollary, such consumers may also suffer antitrust
injury, another element required for standing. Thus, courts ought to
interpret and apply standing requirements so as to include consumers of
zero-price products. This conclusion depends, for normative force,
primarily on deontological, rather than utilitarian, grounds.
Part II then turns to market definition and market power. The most
commonly used tests for both elements depend on the presence of positive
prices. As a result, existing case law suggests reason for concern-some
courts have fallen into fallacious reasoning when attempting to define
markets and measure power absent positive prices. But, as Part II explains,
the frameworks underlying the traditional tests can be adapted to zero-
price markets. Drawing on a robust body of behavioral economics
literature, Part II also observes that analyses of market definition and
market power should account for the power of the Zero-Price Effect.
Part II concludes by addressing defenses and damages. It demonstrates
the unviability, as a matter of both antitrust law and antitrust economics,
of the "free goods defense" already raised by at least one defendant. Part II
also explores the knotty issue of damages calculations. Consumer
psychology research reveals that stated preferences are highly unreliable
vis-a-vis information and attention costs. As a result, Part II urges caution
when stated preferences are proffered as a measure of damages in zero-
price markets.
Part III surveys and critiques the extant case law involving zero-price
markets. It is organized according to well-recognized categories of
strategic conduct: horizontal competitor agreements, tying, exclusive
dealing, etc. In part, the discussion is purely descriptive; it is the first
attempt to gather and report all existing antitrust precedent involving zero-
price markets. The discussion is, by turns, also prescriptive: it not only
evaluates the competence of judges' rulings and reasoning, but also
recommends superior alternatives for use in future cases. Ultimately, this
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
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critique exposes a mixed bag. Antitrust courts have done much more than
mere "hand waving" in the face of zero prices.6  Yet-perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the general lack of guidance from analysts-they
have often fallen into error. Thus, Part IV briefly concludes with a call to
confront head-on the process of modernizing the antitrust enterprise to
account for zero-price markets.
II. THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS
Zero-price markets pose substantial difficulties for several vital
elements of antitrust doctrine. The discussion below is organized around
the order in which those constituent elements tend to anise in antitrust
litigation: standing, followed by market definition and market power,
defenses, and remedies.
A. Consumer Standing
Federal antitrust law is enforced two ways: by the U.S. government and
by private parties. The U.S. government is authorized to sue any party
who has violated the antitrust laws." Private parties, however, must
demonstrate that they have standing to sue. 9 Clayton Act § 4, which
authorizes private treble-damages recovery, grants standing to "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws." 0 To be granted such standing, a private
party must prove (1) injury to its "business or property," and (2) that the
injury suffered qualifies as "antitrust injury," i.e., the particular type of
injury cognizable under federal antitrust law."
1. Are Attention and Information "Property"?
The U.S. government (as well as the rare private plaintiff seeking only
injunctive relief)1 2 need not satisfy the Clayton Act § 4 "business or
6. But see David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 71,
72 (2011) ("[T]here is a tendency on the part of companies, authorities, and courts to do more hand
waving than serious analysis when they encounter products and services offered for free.").
7. 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP ¶ 335 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) ("Everyone other than
the federal government falls into the "private" plaintiff category, which thus includes a state attorney
general invoking federal antitrust law, whether on behalf of the state or of its citizens.").
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
9. 3 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP¶335a.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
11. Id.
12. Private plaintiffs seeking only injunctive relief need not satisfy the "business or property"
2016] 53
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property" requirement. Thus, for example, the federal government
obtained an injunction against the defendants in United States v. H & R
Block, Inc., a case involving (in part) zero-price products,13 without
needing to prove injury to "business or property." Private antitrust
plaintiffs, however, almost universally seek treble damages, thereby
triggering the business-or-property requirement. Private firms participating
in zero-price markets can receive antitrust treble-damages standing by
alleging injury to their "business."1  Individual consumers, however, must
rely on the "property" prong of the requirement.
"Property" (for purposes of Clayton Act § 4 standing) includes money.
In Reiter, a class action brought by consumers against manufacturers of
hearing aids, 1 6 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[a] consumer whose
money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been
injured 'in his . . .property' within the meaning of § 4." Thus, consumers
who are overcharged supracompetitive retail prices have antitrust standing,
even where the relevant products were for personal use. 8
In zero-price markets, however, consumers generally pay not with
money, but with their attention or information.19 Consumer standing in
requirement. Clayton Act § 16, which authorizes injunctive relief, states simply that "[a]ny person ...
shall be entitled to . . . injunctive relief . .. against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
[by a violation of the antitrust laws under the traditional equitable principles]." 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012).
13. 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
14. Cf AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 336 ("[Business] refers to 'commercial interests
or enterprises,' although it also embraces nonprofit plaintiffs." (citation omitted)).
15. Cf id. ("Illegally overcharged consumers are injured in their 'property' interest in the price
and product quality of an unrestrained, competitive market.").
16. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 335 (1979). Not at issue on appeal was whether the
suit would have been barred under the indirect purchaser rule, which forecloses plaintiffs from
recovering where they did not purchase the relevant products directly from the defendant(s). See id. at
334-37.
17. Id. at 339.
18. Id. at 337-45.
19. Newman, supra note 3, at 152. But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online
Market's Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2013). Strandburg argues that
equating payment via information to payment via money is erroneous:
The common analogy between online data collection for behaviorally targeted advertising and
payment for purchases is seriously misleading. There is no functioning market based on
exchanges of personal information for access to online products and services. In a functioning
market, payment of a given price signals consumer demand for particular goods and services,
transmitting consumer preferences to producers. Data collection would serve as "payment" in
that critical sense only if its transfer from users to collectors adequately signaled user
preferences for online goods and services. It does not.
Id. at 95. Strandburg convincingly demonstrates that markets involving the exchange of information
for desired products are imperfect, and likely very imperfect. But it does not follow from such
imperfections that "[t]here is no [such] functioning market." Id. (emphasis added). Markets exist on a
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zero-price markets thus presents a thorny-and, thus far, unanswered-
question: Are information and attention "property" for the narrow
purposes of antitrust damages standing? 2 0
The following analysis suggests that the answer is "yes." Courts have
yet to weigh in squarely on the issue.21 The leading treatise observes
briefly that "[n]onpecuniary injuries are not covered."22  In general,
antitrust theorists appear not to have raised or addressed the question in
any depth. A number of privacy-law scholars have advanced the argument
that personal information be treated as property for general legal
purposes 23-there is also, however, "an extensive literature on the
problems" of doing so.24 Against the backdrop of this robust scholarly
debate, courts have been uniformly reluctant to treat personal information
as property for general legal purposes. 25 Left unexplored by both privacy
scholars and courts is the question of whether attention should ever be
treated as property.
For the narrow purposes of Clayton Act standing, the better reading of
property" is to include information and attention when they are
exchanged for the relevant product(s). A preliminary caveat: this Article
does not seek to weigh in on the scholarly debate, mentioned above, over
spectrum, ranging from "perfectly imperfect" to "perfectly perfect." Imperfect competition does not
equal zero competition. This argument is addressed more thoroughly in Newman, supra note 3.
20. In a state unfair-competition case, a federal district court flatly concluded that "[a] plaintiffs
'personal information' does not constitute property under [California's Unfair Competition Law]." In
re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. Home
Depot, Inc., No. 07cv1058 IEG (WMc), 2007 WL 2746603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007)).
21. Interestingly (albeit tangentially), firms' databases may be regarded as personal property for
purposes of secured transactions, even if the data is not protected under copyright or trade-secret law.
See, e.g., In re Levitz Ins. Agency, Inc., 152 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); Xuan-Thao N.
Nguyen, Collateralizing Privacy, 78 TUL. L. REV. 553, 580-81 (2004).
22. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 345, at 156. This may be referring only to the
personal-injury scenarios contemplated in, e.g., Chadda v. Burcke, 180 F. App'x 370 (3d Cir. 2006).
23. See, e.g., Christopher Rees, Tomorrow 's Privacy: Personal Information as Property, 3 INT'L
DATA PRIVACY L. 220, 220-21 (2013); Jamie Lund, Property Rights to Information, 10 Nw. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 1 (2011); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture ofPrivacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.
56, 63-65 (1999); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic
Defense ofPrivacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996).
24. Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods, and Institutional Design, 82
FORDHAMvL. REV. 1751, 1800 n.227 (2014) (citing examples).
25. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1121 (2016).
Scholz posits that "privacy as property has taken hold in the courts," supporting the statement by
noting two privacy-related torts that "are routinely handled as the property interest 'right of publicity'
in several jurisdictions." Id. But, as Scholz recognizes, "the right of publicity is not relevant to all
forms of privacy." Id. Moreover, the negative implication is that by recognizing only those two types
of privacy harms as touching upon property rights, even the subset of courts that grant this narrow
recognition are simultaneously declining to recognize general property rights over personal
information.
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whether individuals possess general property rights in their information,
nor does it seek to begin such a debate over whether individuals should
possess such rights in their attention. The scope of the present claim is
restricted to Clayton Act standing.
It is, to be sure, unlikely that Congress contemplated either information
or attention when enacting the Clayton Act in 1914. Then, as now, neither
was treated as such for broader legal purposes. Under a strictly originalist
interpretation, therefore, zero-price consumers would likely lack standing
to seek damages under the Clayton Act.26
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not employed such an approach
in interpreting the Clayton Act's grant of standing. Reasoning that the
statute serves an "expansive remedial purpose," the Court has refused to
take a "technical or semantic approach" in interpreting it.27 Rather, the
Court has identified the task and available tools as follows:
The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history,
and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to
construction.... [W]e are to read the statutory language in its
ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the
light . . . of the policy intended to be served by the enactment [and]
281by all other available aids to construction.
Using this holistic approach to interpretation in the Reiter case, the Court
observed that "the word 'property' has a naturally broad and inclusive
meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common usage 'property'
comprehends anything of material value owned or possessed." 29 In fact,
lower courts have read "property" broadly enough to include interests not
commonly thought of as "owned or possessed," for example, a labor
union's opportunity to obtain members30 or the opportunity to work as an
26. Cf Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 Tu. L. REV. 803, 805 (1994)
("[O]riginalist interpretive models treat statutes as commands that emanate from the legislative branch.
The judge's role as interpreter is limited to deciphering these commands and applying them to
particular cases.").
27. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 (1978).
28. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941).
29. Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979).
30. E.g., Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n,
483 F.2d 384, 398 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Since their income is derived from the dues of their members, it
would be contrary to common sense to say that a right to acquire members is not a property right of a
labor union.").
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employee at a rival firm.3 1 Even though such opportunities "may not be
property in the ordinary sense,"3 2 they may support Clayton Act standing.
Given such a broad reading, the business-or-property "limiting words
are of little effect today."33 As the leading treatise explains, "Reiter . . .
made plain that the 'business or property' requirement is virtually always
satisfied provided there is some kind of injury that can properly be
characterized as economic."34 Zero-price markets involve commerce and
exchange of the type that can give rise to economic gains from trade .3
Such markets can, therefore, allow economic harm that is structurally
identical to the types of harms traditionally cognizable under the antitrust
laws. Consumers who have incurred monetary overcharges suffer harm to
their "'property' interest in the price and product quality of an
unrestrained, competitive market." 36 Like all consumers, those who use
zero-price products have a "property interest" in the fruits of a competitive
marketplace. That interest can suffer economic injury.37 As a result,
existing precedent disfavors a categorical denial of standing to consumers
of zero-price products.
Moreover, as the Reiter Court observed, "'property' comprehends
anything of material value owned or possessed."38 Information and
attention have come to hold "material value." And consumers may
"possess" their information or attention, even assuming they do not "own"
those assets as a general matter of property law.39 One might well ask: If
consumers do not initially possess their information or attention, who
does? Consumers possess their attention, and at least some types of their
information, until the moment they trade these assets to firms in exchange
for valuable products. Pursuing the transaction further through the chain of
distribution bolsters this conclusion. For example, once a firm has
collected and stored personal information in its servers, the firm-which
can often exclude third parties from accessing that particular data while it
is under the firm's control-would seem to possess that information. Such
31. Nichols v. Spencer Int'lPress, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
32. Id.
33. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 335c1.
34. Id. ¶ 336.
35. See Newman, supra note 3.
36. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 336.
37. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing antitrust injury).
38. Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (emphasis added).
39. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over whether
information is "property" for general legal purposes).
2016] 57
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
firms often sell data to third parties. Again, one might ask: If the seller
never possessed the information, what was sold?
Finally, the Court instructs that where interpretation of the Clayton Act
seems doubtful, issues should be resolved "in the light . . . of the policy
intended to be served by the enactment."40 The antitrust laws are meant to
remedy harm to the competitive process resulting from the creation,
enhancement, or abuse of market power.4 ' Because the enhancement of
power in zero-price markets can-and has-resulted in harm to
competition and consumers,42 an inclusive reading of "property" would
further that policy. Thus, courts applying the Clayton Act's grant of
standing should interpret "property" so as to include attention and
information.
2. Antitrust Injury
Mere injury to "business or property" is not enough for antitrust
standing. Plaintiffs must also demonstrate "antitrust injury, which is to say
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 43 The particular
types of injury that qualify generally include higher prices (i.e.,
overcharges), reduced output, lower quality, or less innovation.44
Consumers of zero-price products can suffer any of these types of harm
as a result of anticompetitive conduct-only the medium, not the fact, of
exchange is different. 5 Anticompetitive conduct in zero-price markets
may yield higher attention or information costs (i.e., overcharges), reduced
output of the zero-price or an interrelated product, lower quality, or less
competitive efforts directed toward innovation.
The principle of "treating like things alike" is "an idea of great
resonance for law (equal justice under law, equal protection of the laws,
equality before the law, one law for rich and poor, and so forth)."46
Consumers of zero-price products can suffer-and have suffered-
40. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941).
41. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals ofAntitrust: Welfare Trumps
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2013) (referring to "[t]he promotion of economic welfare
as the lodestar of antitrust laws" (citation omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 3, at 175-76 (discussing welfare harm to listeners resulting
from broadcast-radio mergers).
43. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
44. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (denying
standing to a competitor that claimed only "loss of profits due to possible price competition").
45. Newman, supra note 3, at 190.
46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42 (1990).
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antitrust harms that are structurally identical to those suffered by
consumers of positive-price products. It would thus run counter to a
fundamental, time-honored legal principle to treat as cognizable injuries to
one group but not to the other.
Radio mergers provide an instructive example. Satellite radio is
generally delivered to listeners in exchange for subscription fees, while
broadcast-radio listeners consume the product at zero prices. In 2008,
Sirius and XM, then the two major satellite-radio providers, merged.48
After the merger, Sirius XM allegedly raised the subscription fees it
charged listeners. 49 A class action comprising satellite-radio consumers
filed antitrust claims against the merged entity under Clayton Act § 7 and
Sherman Act § 2. Although the defendant challenged plaintiffs' standing
to bring certain state-law claims, it conceded federal antitrust standing,o
an unsurprising move given that plaintiffs likely possessed such standing.
Ultimately, after having received certification, the class settled out of court
for a package valued at $193 million.'
Analogous overcharges have occurred in broadcast-radio markets.
Following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
industry experienced rapid, massive consolidation. Empirical research
demonstrates that as competition in many markets dwindled, airtime
devoted to advertisements increased.52 Thus, broadcast-radio listeners have
suffered (and likely continue to suffer) attention-cost overcharges
stemming from a reduction in competition. 53 As a structural matter, these
overcharges are no different than those allegedly suffered by satellite-radio
customers. It would be an odd public policy that called for disparate
treatment of the two groups by barring one from effective access to the
courts. To the extent antitrust law should treat consumers of zero-price
products differently, 4 it ought not do so at the standing stage.
Information- or attention-based harms are not mere "personal" injuries,
which are insufficient to confer antitrust standing. Suffering an injury
47. Newman, supra note 3, at 174.
48. Blessingv. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, When Mergers Become a Private Matter: An
Updated Antitrust Primer, 26 ANTITRUST 41, 42 (2012).
52. Catherine Tyler Mooney, Market Power and Audience Segmentation Drive Radio
Advertising Levels 19 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/
conference/download.cgi?db name=II0C2010&paper id=203.
53. Newman, supra note 3, at 193.
54. For some purposes, such consumers should receive unique analytical treatment. See infra
Parts I.B-II.E.
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causally linked to an antitrust violation is not per se enough to confer
antitrust standing." A personal injury will not suffice. 6 In Chadda v.
Burcke, for example, a plaintiff who purportedly suffered bodily injuries
from a defective cosmetic sold to her by the defendant could not recover
under the antitrust laws, even assuming the defendant's alleged
anticompetitive conduct caused the product defect. 7 The antitrust harm in
such a case would consist only of the overcharge-the difference in price
between the cosmetic as sold and the cosmetic as it would have been sold
in a competitive market. Attention and information overcharges are
"personal" in a sense; they involve costs extracted from the "person" of a
consumer. But they are not personal injuries in the sense that would
disqualify remedy under the antitrust laws. Where attention or information
overcharges (or lower quality, less innovation, etc.) result from the
creation, enhancement, or abuse of market power, they lie squarely within
the boundaries of the antitrust laws.
The Clayton Act's standing provision encompasses consumers of zero-
price products. Congress intended to create a dual-enforcement structure
for the antitrust laws.' If one leg of that structure is hamstrung by a lack
of damages standing, the antitrust enterprise will fail to function as
intended.
B. Modernizing Traditional Standards: Market Definition and Market
Power
The core concern of modem antitrust is with market power. In most
cases, defining the relevant market is a prerequisite to proving that a
defendant has market power. Thus, the market definition and market
power inquiries are of utmost importance to antitrust doctrine. Yet, current
formulations of these inquiries depend on the presence of positive prices.
Zero-price markets, then, present a challenge for antitrust-though not an
unworkable one.
1. Market Definition
Market definition has come under attack from some scholars,59 and the
2010 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMGs) relegate market
55. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 345 ("Nonpecuniary injuries are not covered.").
56. Id.
57. See Chadday. Burcke, 180 F. App'x 370 (3d Cir. 2006).
58. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive, 79
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definition to a somewhat diminished role as compared with earlier
versions.60 Yet defining the relevant market remains an important, often
crucial, element of antitrust analysis.6 ' The core assumption is that (ceteris
paribus) the higher a firm's share, the greater the firm's market power.
And market definition can also play other roles in antitrust analysis,
including examining entry, assessing competitive effects, and adding
"clarity and power" to narratives in antitrust cases.62
a. Reasonable and Functional Interchangeability
In the U.S. tradition, market definition focuses on demand elasticity.
The standard most commonly cited by courts hinges on "reasonable
interchangeability." 63 Under this standard, products are part of the same
relevant market where they are reasonably interchangeable by customers.
As do many "reasonableness" standards, the reasonable-interchangeability
test presents a fagade of clarity that disguises a lack of actual guidance. At
some extreme level, all products could be thought of as interchangeable:
customers with scarce resources must choose how to allocate those
resources, and a decision to acquire one product necessitates (at the
margin) giving up the opportunity to acquire another. Thus, for example, a
consumer may decide to forego dinner at a restaurant in order to save for
retirement. It does not follow that restaurant meals and mutual funds are
part of the same antitrust product market. Conversely, no product is
perfectly interchangeable with another; there will always be some minute
ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (2013).
60. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 4 (2010) ("The Agencies' analysis need not start with market definition Some of the
analytical tools used by the Agences to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition
..... ), with U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1
(1992) ("[F]or each product or service ... of each merging firm, the Agency seeks to define a market
in which firms could effectively exercise market power if they were able to coordinate their actions.").
61. Market definition currently plays a significant role in the analysis of mergers under Clayton
Act § 7, restraints of trade that fall under the "rule of reason" under Sherman Act § 1, and
monopolization (and attempted monopolization) under Sherman Act § 2.
62. See Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 2, 14,
21 (Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2004655.
63. Perhaps the most commonly cited formulation appears in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
64. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953) ("The circle
must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable variations in price,
only a limited number of buyers will turn in technical terms, products whose 'cross-elasticities of
demand' are small.").
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difference in cost, packaging, branding, etc.65 Yet it does not follow that
Chiquita and Del Monte bananas are part of different antitrust product
markets. The reasonable-interchangeability test does make clear that
neither extreme end of the spectrum is the correct starting point. But
beyond this, it offers little aid.
Courts and enforcement agencies have used a variety of tools to
attempt to answer the question of whether products are "reasonably
interchangeable." Most of these focus on prices. For example, the
Court's analysis in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,
hinged on "the extent to which consumers will change their consumption
of one product in response to a price change in another."6 " Another
common method is exemplified by Judge Hand's finding in United States
v. Alcoa that price differences between two products indicated that those
products were not in the same market.69
Courts and enforcers have also looked to functional attributes in
determining whether products are "reasonably interchangeable." Where
products serve similar functions (e.g., cellophane and butcher paper),
courts have concluded that they belong in the same product market.70
Again, though, problems with levels of abstraction arise. At a high level,
cellophane and butcher paper both serve the function of wrapping
foodstuffs: they may be said to be "functionally interchangeable." At a
low level, however, butcher paper has much lower pliability and much
higher permeability than cellophane. The U.S. Supreme Court, using a
high level of abstraction in analyzing functional characteristics, found that
cellophane competed in the same market as other "flexible wrappings" and
concluded that no single firm had monopoly power in that market. This
65. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) ("[O]ne can
theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity with each
manufacturer having power over the price and production of his own product. However, this power ...
is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly." (citation omitted)).
66. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2080 (2012) ("To an antitrust lawyer,
brands aren't markets."). Lemley and McKenna contend that this common heuristic is deficient in the
face of modem markets, which feature products that are often-and perhaps most often-quite
differentiated. Id. at 2081.
67. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 556-75
(Jonathan M. Jacobson et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007).
68. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serys., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992) (emphasis added).
69. United States v. Alumnium Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1964).
70. E.g., E.I. du Pont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377.
71. Id. at 399-404.
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conclusion later came to be regarded as incorrect. 7 2 With "functional
interchangeability" as with "reasonable interchangeability," inconsistent
application of the law is inevitable.
The more heterogeneous are the products in a market, the worse the
analysis seems to become. Courts have reached wildly varying results in
highly differentiated product markets. Adjudicated antitrust product
markets have ranged from very narrow, idiosyncratic markets-e.g., for
Jackson Pollock paintings 7 3-to broad, all-encompassing markets like "ice
cream" or "furniture." Confronted with differentiated products, which
fall along a "spectrum of price and quality differences,"7 6 antitrust
tribunals often have thrown up their hands, making observations like
"product variances . . .are economically meaningless where the
differences are actually part of a spectrum."77
Zero-price products are often highly differentiated (at least from the
perspective of users), making the reasonable-interchangeability approach
(and its functional-interchangeability variant) particularly unsuited for
market-definition analysis. Despite this, at least one court used a
functional-interchangeability approach to define a zero-price market. 79 In
LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., the district court accepted an alleged
market for "Internet-based social networking."s0 Pointing to "Internet
connectivity services like America Online," as well as "online dating
sites," the defendant argued for a broader definition."' The court rejected
those contentions, reasoning that Internet connectivity services "simply
... give users the ability to access the Internet," and that online dating
72. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 960-61 (1981) (explaining that the Court likely erred by inferring lack of market
power from the observed fact that "there was some substitution between cellophane and other flexible
wrapping materials at the current price ofcellophane").
73. Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL 654494, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. July, 5 1994).
74. In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
75. See Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Inds., Inc., 889 F.2d 524, 528
(4th Cir. 1989).
76. Id. at 528 (quoting In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. at
1268) (emphasis omitted).
77. E.g., Western Parcel Express v. UPS, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting In
re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. at 1268).
78. See Newman, supra note 3 at 178.
79. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff'd, 304 Fed. Appx. 554 (9th Cir. 2008).
80. Id. at *7 ("[T]he Court finds that LiveUniverse sufficiently alleges a relevant antitrust market
of Intemet-based social networking websites.").
81. Id. at *5-6.
2016] 63
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sites' "dominant function and purpose is to enable users to meet potential
dates." 8 2 In contrast, online social networks were "used to get in touch
with old friends and to keep current friends informed about what's new
and exciting," attributes that rendered social networks sufficiently unique
as to constitute a relevant antitrust market. 83 Though the court may have
been correct in concluding that online social networking was a relevant
market, its analysis lacked rigor.
Because they allow such subjective applications, these standards
present serious problems in practice. Those problems are likely to worsen,
rather than improve, in the zero-price context. Consequently, antitrust law
ought to leave such approaches behind, or at least relegate them to a
secondary role, when confronting zero-price markets.
The widespread adoption of the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT)
approach is due in large part to the unworkability of bare "reasonable" and
"functional" interchangeability analyses and the inchoate body of case law
they have spawned. 4 The question, then, is whether even the more modem
HMT approach is workable, for it-like much of antitrust law-depends
heavily on positive prices.
b. The HMT and Proposed Reforms: Implementing a "SSNIC" Test
In merger, and at least occasionally in non-merger contexts, U.S.
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies employ the HMT to define
markets. 6 The HMT asks whether a hypothetical firm that controlled all
sales of the relevant product(s) would likely be able to profitably impose
"at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price
(SSNIP) on at least one product in the market."8 7 A SSNIP is usually-
82. Id. at *6.
83. Id.
84. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 910b (explaining that the advent of
the HIT was a response to the outmoded reasoning on display in Brown Shoe and its progeny).
85. Some contend that problems inhere in extending the HMT to non-merger analyses. See
Lawrence J. White, Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm Is
Missing, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 913 (2008) ("[T]he [HMT market definition
paradigm] is sensibly used only in the context of aforward-looking question: 'Will this merger permit
the creation or enhancement of market power?"').
86. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262 (6th Cir. 2014) (contemplating
application of the HMT to Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 claims); United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F.
Supp. 3d 143, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing Government expert economist's use of the HMT to
define the relevant market in a Shenran Act § 1 case).
87. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 60, § 4.1.1.
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though not always-taken to mean a two-year, five-percent increase in the
total price paid by customers.
This analytical framework loses its coherence in zero-price markets,
where the basic unit of value extracted from customers is not expressed as
a price. Mathematically, "[t]he SSNIP test becomes inoperable when the
basic price is zero."89 Five percent of zero is still zero.
Without some sense of proportion between the hypothetical price
increase and the total price, the hypothetical-monopolist test as currently
constituted becomes unsatisfyingly arbitrary. Zero-price markets offer no
reference point for sizing the hypothetical price increase. As a result, any
number used will be the product of haphazard selection.90
A recent case illustrates the problem. In Streamcast Networks,
Streamcast and Kazaa distributed competing versions of a peer-to-peer
(P2P) software application called "FastTrack."91 Streamcast filed Sherman
Act claims against Kazaa and others, alleging a "worldwide market for the
provision of FastTrack P2P file-sharing services and the selling of
advertising directed to users of such services."92 The district court first
enunciated the standard for defining antitrust markets, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court's statement in Eastman Kodak that markets are defined
using cross-elasticity of demand, which "refers to 'the extent to which
consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a
price change in another."' 93 The Streamcast court proceeded to reject the
alleged market as too narrow, reasoning that "there is simply no indication
88. Id. § 4.1.2 ("The Agencies most often use a SSNIP of five percent."); see United States v.
Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *32 (defining a relevant market as
"R&R platforms in the United States for retailers and manufacturers" in part because "other social
commerce tools are most often complements rather than substitutes, and there is no persuasive
evidence that this will change in the next two years" (emphasis added)).
89. Evans, supra note 6, at 72; see also Minsuk Han, Barely Legal: The Antitrust Economics of
Free Software: Can Firms Evade Antitrust Scrutiny by Selling Apps for Free?, CORNELL DAILY SUN
(May 2, 2014), https://issuu.com/cornellsun/docs/05-02-14_entire issue lo res ("[I]f the base price of
a product is zero, we cannot define the relevant market using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test.").
90. The limitations of the SSNIP test when applied to free goods have been recognized
elsewhere. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 32; Cf Miguel Sousa Ferro, "Ceci N'est Pas un
Marche": Gratuity and Competition Law 8-16 (Sept. 8, 2014) (preliminary draft), http://papers.ssrn
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2493236; Evans, supra note 6; Angela Daly, Free Software and the
Law: Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire: How Shaking up Intellectual Property Suits
Competition Just Fine, J. PEER PRODUCTION (2013), http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-3-free-
software-epistemics/peer-reviewed-papers/; Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking,
90 N.C L. REv. 1771, 1785-86 (2012).
91. Streamcast Networks, Inc. v. Skype Techs., S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089-90 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
92. Id. at 1094.
93. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992))
(emphasis added).
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that users . . . would not switch from FastTrack . .. to another provider or
network if even the most nominal of fees were charged."94 Yet, without
some basis for comparing the price increase to the total price, this analysis
lacks rigor-it is meaningless to call a price increase "nominal" if the
benchmark price is zero.95 This fallacy is referred to infra as the "First
Streamcast Fallacy."
Despite this shortcoming, however, the HMT may not be entirely
unworkable in zero-price markets. By substituting the relevant exchanged
cost(s)-i.e., information and/or attention-for prices, enforcers may gain
insight as to how closely products compete. The question becomes
whether a hypothetical monopolist would likely impose an "SSNIC"-a
small but significant and non-transitory increase in (exchanged) costs-on
customers.96 For example, investigators analyzing a merger between two
search providers might ask whether a market-wide five percent increase in
the amount (or length, duration, etc.) of advertisements would cause
search customers to substitute away to a different product. 9 7 Alternatively,
a court might base its market definition in part on evidence of past
increases in the levels of attention or information costs extracted by the
market participants.
The nature of zero-price markets does raise several potential problems
that must be confronted in the course of conducting SSNIC analyses. First,
analysts must cabin their inquiries to situations that hold constant all
variables other than the one of interest. Both attention costs and
information costs can be quite heterogeneous, complicating analyses
considerably. 98 For example, consumers may not perceive a five-percent
increase in the space devoted to advertisements to be an additional cost at
all, if the increase is accompanied by a substantial enough decrease in (for
example) the length of time during which those advertisements are
displayed. Likewise, a consumer may not perceive a five-percent increase
in the amount of information requested by a supplier to be a net cost where
there is a corresponding decrease in the sensitivity of the information
94. Id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
95. It bears noting that increasing prices from zero to any positive number represents an infinite
increase, raising the question of how an infinite increase can also be nominal.
96. Or, for a monopsonist, on buyers. As explained more fully infra, this reference to "costs"
should not be taken to mean all costs incurred in a transaction. Rather, the focus is on exchanged costs.
In the type of transactions salient here, those comprise information costs, attention costs, or both.
97. This discussion follows the district court's reasoning in United States v. Am. Express Co., 88
F. Supp. 3d 143, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), that "two-sided platform[s] comprise[] at least two separate,
yet deeply interrelated, markets."
98. See discussion, supra Part II.A.1.
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requested. 99 Unless analysts take care to hold such variables constant, this
heterogeneity could increase the likelihood of error, along with its
attendant costs.
This difficulty illuminates a second question: What is the relevant cost?
The HMT is ultimately concerned with how customers (or sellers, in the
case of buyer-power analyses) would respond to an increase in the
exchanged cost of the relevant product. In traditional, positive-price
markets, analysts can properly view price as representing the relevant
exchanged cost: the price paid constitutes the valuable consideration
exchanged by buyers for the relevant product(s). But in zero-price
markets, this is not the case. Firms in zero-price markets often make their
profits by extracting information, attention, or both. 00 In other words, the
cost to zero-price customers of a given relevant product may consist
entirely of increased information costs, entirely of increased attention
costs, or a combination of the two in any proportion. Analysts must tailor
their focus to the appropriate cost(s)-i.e., the cost(s) most likely to be
increased by a hypothetical monopolist.' 0 '
In some clear-cut cases, the relevant cost will be immediately apparent.
For example, in broadcast-radio markets, listeners incur attention costs,
but not information costs.1 02 Mixed cases are more difficult. Here, the
proper question is whether a hypothetical monopolist likely would
profitably impose at least a SSNIC in either information or attention costs.
If the answer is yes to either type of cost, the market under analysis should
be considered a relevant antitrust market: it is susceptible to
anticompetitive effects stemming from market power.
Complicating matters further, customers' perceptions of information
and attention costs may be inaccurate. This unreliability may present
practical problems for hypothetical-monopolist market-definition analyses.
It is relatively difficult for consumers to evaluate the costs and benefits of
zero-price products.1 03 Hoofiagle and Whittington posit that "free offers
99. To illustrate, this could occur if a supplier were to stop requesting Social Security numbers
and start requesting additional, but less sensitive, information.
100. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
101. This process is somewhat analogous to one contemplated by the HMGs: "Where explicit or
implicit prices for the firms' specific contribution to value can be identified with reasonable clarity, the
Agencies may base the SSNIP on those prices." HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 60,
§ 4.1.2. The Agencies appear to have done so on only one occasion to date. See Competitive Impact
Statement at 10, United States v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00823 (D.D.C. May 20, 2014).
102. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REv. 49, 73 (2008)
("Valuing bundles [that include free offers] can be an opaque exercise and can cause consumers to
make purchase decisions differently depending on presentation.").
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are . . . used widely as an enticement to get consumers to try a product
without realizing its costs."'0 4 Strandburg claims that consumers generally
do not understand the types and prevalence of potential data-collection-
related harms, do not understand firms' data-related practices, and do not
understand "how any given instance of data collection fits into the data
about them that is already flowing in the online ecosystem."'o And
Shelanski suggests that "a platform's use and protection of customer data
is often difficult for consumers to observe or understand." 0 6
These problems of transparency and calculability are relatively less
present with regard to attention costs, where consumers are at least
sometimes able to observe and better understand the trade-offs they
face. 0 7 Even here, however, technological advances have complicated the
picture. Behavioral (or "targeted") advertising creates greater consumer
uncertainty than the more familiar "contextual" advertising that
accompanied traditional zero-price products like broadcast television and
radio.'0o And, as discussed further infra, consumers may underestimate
attention costs attendant to all advertisements, not just behavioral ones.' 09
Finally, information costs are unique-while they represent a cost to
customers, they do not automatically translate into increased profits for
suppliers, at least not in the short run. Using the example of "an online
publisher that decides to collect and mine additional consumer data,"
Cooper points out that "collecting, storing, and analyzing data is an
additional cost" to the publisher."o Ultimately, suppliers increase
information costs to improve the quality of their products, increase
advertising-related revenues (or revenues from simply selling the extra
104. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 613 (2014).
105. Strandburg, supra note 19, at 132-33 (concluding that "Internet users cannot make
meaningful assessments of the marginal expected disutility of any given use of an online product or
service").
106. Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1690 (2013).
107. This is true at least after the customer has experienced the relevant product; many forms of
digital content comprise "experience goods," the value (and, in the zero-price context, cost) of which
cannot ex ante be accurately assessed by consumers. See Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and
Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 101-02 (2006)
(explaining, within a discussion of IP-protected digital content, that "the quality and characteristics of
experience goods typically 'can be assessed only after they are bought" (quoting MICHAEL PARKIN,
MICROECONOMICS 468 (2d ed. 1994))).
108. See Strandburg, supra note 19, at 131 ("[I]t is nearly impossible for a consumer to estimate
the increment in expected harm associated with a given instance of data collection.").
109. See infra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
110. James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and
Subjectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1135 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
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data, perhaps to advertisers), or both."' From this, Cooper concludes that
"reducing privacy would be an odd way to exercise market power."11 2 This
conclusion holds as to the first motive for suppliers increasing information
costs: improving product quality would be an odd way to exercise market
power, though it may ultimately lead to higher revenues. The conclusion
does not, however, hold true as to the second motive: increasing
information costs to increase advertising-related revenues would be a
rational way for a firm to exercise market power. Thus, a SSNIC test
focusing on information cost is an appropriate means of defining markets
(and ultimately allowing inferences about market power)-but analysts
must hold constant an additional variable. The appropriate question is
whether a hypothetical monopolist would likely impose a SSNIC without
increasing the quality of the relevant product." 3
All of these issues counsel against placing too much weight on the
evidence yielded by zero-price customer interviews, one of the most
common fact-gathering methods used by antitrust analysts. "1 That is not
to say, however, that such evidence has no value. Although information
and attention costs are more problematic in terms of transparency and
calculability than are prices, they are not entirely opaque. Customers can,
and sometimes do, make purchasing or product-substitution decisions
based on relative changes in information or attention costs." 5 Thus,
analysts and courts should not entirely discount industry-participant
interview evidence in zero-price markets. Furthermore, evidence of
revealed preferences (e.g., natural experiments) is not subject to many of
these shortcomings.
c. Application and Limitations ofa "SSNIQ" Test
To date, the only high court to have squarely addressed market
definition in a zero-price context is the Chinese Supreme People's Court.
In Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, the People's Court engaged in a sophisticated
analysis of several issues arising out of an alleged violation of China's
111. See id. at 1135-36.
112. Id. at 1136.
113. Put another way, the question is, "Would a hypothetical monopolist likely impose a SSNIC
in order to sell the additional information or use it to increase advertising revenues?"
114. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Erik Gruenwedel, CEO: Hulu Plus Eyeing Ad-Free Streaming, HOME MEDIA
MAGAZINE (Sept. 27, 2013),http://www.homemediamagazine.com/hulu/ceo-hulu-plus-eyeing-ad-free-
streaming-31484?print=1 ("[Hulu's CEO] acknowledged what has emerged as a not-so-positive
differentiator between Hulu Plus and [its competitors]: ad spots.").
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Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)."6 Among these was whether the HMT was
appropriate given that the relevant product (online instant messaging
services) was offered "free."
The People's Court avoided the First Streamcast Fallacy. As a general
matter, the court observed, "when the market equilibrium price of a
commodity is zero, it is particularly difficult to use SSNIP because it is
necessary to determine an appropriate benchmark price."" More
specifically, the court pointed out, the problem arises because, "[w]hen the
benchmark price is zero, the price remains at zero after growth of 5-
10%."1l9 Thus-unlike the Streamcast court-the People's Court avoided
the fallacy of defining a market based on users' predicted response to a
"small" increase in price where the prevailing price was zero.
Instead, the People's Court espoused a "SSNDQ" test, a variation on
the hypothetical-monopolist test that focuses on a hypothetical "Small but
Significant and Not-transitory [sic] Decline of Quality."12 0 While this
approach may sometimes be correct, a word of caution is needed. In many
zero-price markets, product quality is attained primarily via sunk research-
and-development costs, while the marginal cost of delivering a high-
quality instead of a low-quality product may be minimal. Consider, for
example, streaming online radio services. The bulk of costs relating to
creating a high-quality user experience arise from copyright licensing fees
and product development. The incremental cost of providing audio at 192
kbps versus 128 kbps is relatively small.121 The commoditized industries
116. Teng Xun Gongsiyu Qi Hu Gongsi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (JJT E& fl-$
]IE }'A+Qft&) [Beijing Qihoo 360 Technology Co. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co.],
(Sup. People's Ct. 2013) (China), translated in https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/
DecisionTranslation.pdf [hereinafter Beijing Qihoo]. China's AML was modeled to some degree after
U.S. antitrust and European competition laws, and its application in this case drew heavily from well-
established antitrust principles (including use of the HMT in market definition). For a high-level
discussion of similarities and differences between Chinese and Western competition laws, see, e.g.,
New Chinese AntiMonopoly Law, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (Oct. 2007), http://wwwjonesday.com/
NewChinese Anti-Monopoly Law/.
117. Beijing Qihoo, supra note 116. The following discussion is not meant to weigh in on the
broader question of whether the HMT is appropriate for use in non-merger contexts. For an argument
that the HMT is not appropriate in non-merger contexts, see White, supra note 85.
118. Beijing Qihoo, supra note 116.
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added). Gal and Rubinfeld similarly advocate the use of a quality-focused
analysis in at least those zero-price markets where consumers do not pay via attention or information:
"[J]n markets in which all goods are provided for free, we suggest a variation of the SSNIP test, which
evaluates the market boundaries by measuring the effects of small but significant and non-transitory
changes in quality (SSNIQ)." Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 35.
121. Cf Dan Rayburn, Detailing Netflix's Streaming Costs: Average Movie Costs Five Cents to
Deliver, STREAMINGMEDIABLOG (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:11 PM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2009/03
/estimates-on-what-it-costs-netflixs-to-stream-movieshtml
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that typified historical antitrust-enforcement actions did not exhibit this
dynamic. Sellers of pasta, for example, could lower their costs a great deal
by agreeing to fix semolina flour content at artificially low levels.1 22 Such
a scheme may be profitable despite the attendant loss of customers due to
the lowered quality of the relevant product.
As a result, it is unlikely that firms enjoying market power in at least
some zero-price markets would choose to exercise that power by lowering
quality. Where doing so would result in negligible cost reduction, the
attendant loss of customers would likely make an SSNDQ irrational-yet
a relevant antitrust market may still be present. Consequently, SSNDQ
tests are more appropriate where marginal costs vary substantially in
tandem with quality levels, and less appropriate where that is not the case.
2. Market Power
As with market definition, the traditional tests for analyzing whether a
firm has market power depend heavily on positive prices. For example, in
Sherman Act § 1 claims that fall under the rule of reason,1 23 the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined market power as "the ability to raise prices
above those that would be charged in a competitive market." 24  i
Sherman Act § 2 cases, the Court has defined market power as "the power
to control prices or exclude competition." 25 1i merger cases brought under
Clayton Act § 7, courts focus on whether a transaction will "lessen
competition,",26 but this too is typically understood as involving higher
*127prices.
In a zero-price market, there is no price for a dominant firm to control.
As a result, "[t]raditional market power analysis is not designed to apply to
free goods." 28 It is not necessarily the case that a firm, having acquired
122. See Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'nv. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 424-26 (7th Cir. 1965).
123. Though the text of § 1 condemns "[e]very ... restraint of trade," courts read the statute "as if
the word 'unreasonable' appeared before 'restraint."' AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1500.
Certain categories of conduct are treated as per se unreasonable; others are analyzed under the "rule of
reason," a broad-ranging inquiry that takes into account "how a challenged practice might restrain or
harm competition, how it might benefit the parties and society, and whether some alternative behavior
would be preferable." Id.
124. NCAAv. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984).
125. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
126. This language is contained in Clayton Act § 7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
127. E.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Generally, under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, a prima facie case can be made if the government establishes that the
merged entities will have a significant percentage of the relevant market-enabling them to raise
prices above competitive levels.").
128. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 36.
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market power in a zero-pnce market, will then exercise that power by
imposing a positive price for its product.1 29 Experience and theory
demonstrate that zero prices may remain at zero even where market shares
shift substantially in favor of a single provider. 3 0 Instead of raising prices
to consumers, a dominant firm may be more likely to increase information
costs, attention costs, or both, particularly in light of the Zero-Price Effect,
discussed further infra.'3 ' A similar dynamic is at play in a market where
firms compete primarily on the amount of output they produce, which is
sold at a single market-clearing price. 32 i such a market, a dominant firm
will likely exercise its market power not by directly increasing its prices,
but by directly or indirectly (via, e.g., eliminating capacity) reducing
output so as to raise the market-clearing price. Similarly, in zero-price
markets, relatively more of the competitive action surrounds customer
133information and attention-at least as compared to price.
But the Supreme Court's formulations of the test for market power can
be made workable in zero-price markets if "price" is understood to be
interchangeable with "information or attention costs." The term "price" in
antitrust law and economics is often understood to encompass nonprice
features like quality. It is admittedly doubtful that the Court had
information or attention costs in mind when formulating its various price-
focused, market-power standards. Yet the growing body of modem
decisions overturning long-entrenched antitrust precedent stands clearly
for the proposition that antitrust doctrines must evolve to reflect changing
marketplace realities and economic understanding.1 3 4 The classic "control
prices or exclude competition" framework for evaluating market power
129. Argenton and Prufer's model follows this logic, predicting that one firm will eventually gain
a one hundred percent share (i.e., that the market is a natural monopoly), yet assuming prices will
remain fixed at zero. See Cedric Argenton & Jens Prifer, Search Engine Competition with Network
Externalities, 8 J. COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 73 (2012).
130. Assuming, for example, that there is a relevant market for generalized search results
delivered to European consumers, Google has enjoyed a 90+ percent share for years, yet its price
remains at zero. See, e.g., Editorial, Google 's Offer to Europe, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/opinion/googles-offer-to-europe.html.
131. See infra Part II.C.
132. This is a characteristic of the venerable Cournot model of competition. See, e.g., Gregory J.
Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly
Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 722 (2004) ("The usual version of the Cournot model ... features a
single, homogeneous product. Cournot competitors choose quantities.").
133. Of course, quality and innovation competition can still occur, and may even account for the
lion's share of competitive efforts in a given zero-price market. The present focus, however, is on
monetary as compared to nonmonetary exchanged costs.
134. E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overturning
per se rule against vertical minimum price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)
(overturning per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing).
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should likewise evolve to reflect the centrality of information and attention
costs in zero-price markets.
In practice, evaluating market power in zero-price markets will often
be more difficult than doing so in markets with positive prices. As with
market definition, analysis is complicated by the nature of information and
attention costs.13 Furthermore, information and attention competition
among firms is often not as robust as price competition, even in relatively
competitive markets.13 6 Il some zero-price markets, the available market-
power evidence will be less plentiful and less clear.
The types of evidence that show market power in zero-price markets,
however, may be the same as in positive-price markets. Evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects should continue to be sufficient for courts to infer
market power. 3 7 Wherever possible, natural experiments-particularly
past increases or decreases in attention or information costs, decreases in
quality, and competitive entry or exit-should play a substantial role.
Qualitative evidence of the inputs into a firm's decisionmaking may also
be valuable.
Absent direct evidence, structural analyses of market shares and
concentration may hold value. Where analysts rely on structural indicators
of market power, however, they should reject arguments to the effect that
the appropriate metric for measuring market share is always sales revenue.
Thus, for example, the court in Live Universe, Inc. correctly declined to
hold that the "appropriate measure of a firm's share is [always] the
quantity of goods or services actually sold to consumers." 3 8 Instead, the
court adopted number of users as the market-share metric, observing that,
"[c]arried to its logical conclusion, [the defendant's] argument would
mean that a company offering a free product . .. could never acquire
market power."39
135. See supra Part II.B.1.
136. See Newman, supra note 3, at Part III.B.
137. Cf FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (holding that proof of actual
anticompetitive effects "obviate[s] the need for an inquiry into market power").
138. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff'd, 304 Fed. App'x 554 (9th Cir. 2008).
139. Id.
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C. The Zero-Price Effect in Action
A robust body of behavioral economics research points to the existence
of the Zero Price Effect (ZPE). For ease of analysis, neoclassical
economics often assumes that demand curves are linear. The ZPE,
however, suggests that when prices reach zero, consumer demand
skyrockets-even where a standard cost-benefit analysis seems to favor a
non-zero-price alternative .140
1. Substitutability ofPositive- and Zero-Price Products
Consumers' outsized preference for zero-price products over positive-
price products tends to mean that a given zero-price product and a given
positive-price product do not compete in the same antitrust product
market. The ZPE creates an unexpectedly high degree of consumer
demand for zero-price products relative to positive-price products.' 4 1 This
nonlinearity complicates market-definition analyses.
The ZPE dictates that any increase in price from zero to a positive
amount-no matter how "small" in absolute terms-will trigger
substantial customer substitution away from the now-positive-price
product.1 4 2 As a result, the competitive action in many zero-price markets
occurs around nonprice attributes. This is so because the ZPE influences
rational firms' strategic behavior. Suppose firm X decides to compete
directly with competitor Y, whose product is priced at zero. All else being
equal, X would be severely disadvantaged by offering its competing
product at a positive price. 143 X would thus either mimic the strategy that
allows Y to offer zero prices or employ a unique strategy that will allow X
140. See, e.g., Kristina Shampanier et al., Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free
Products, 26 MARKETING SCI. 742, 743 (2007); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 55-65 (2008); see also Juan L. Nicolau & Ricardo
Sellers, The Free Breakfast Effect: An Experimental Approach to the Zero Price Model in Tourism,
51(3) J. TRAVEL RES. 243, 244 (2012).
141. See Shampanier et al., supra note 140, at 742; see also John M. Newman, Copyright
Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1409 (2013) (discussing the ZPE in the context of markets for
creative works).
142. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. This is true at least where the customers are
natural persons. See Newman, supra note 3, at 187-89 (discussing the limitations of behavioral
economics vis-a-vis firm behavior).
143. Cf Robert Bork, High-Stakes Antitrust: The Last Hurrah?, in HIGH-STAKES ANTITRUST:
THE LAST HURRAH? 45, 55 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003) ("[Microsoft] was earning supracompetitive
returns on the monopoly it was defending, while Netscape, forced to distribute its Navigator free, had
no income in that market to cover its fixed costs. Understandably, Netscape gave up a contest it could
not win.").
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to set its price at zero. 4 4 This suggests that, where a given product is
offered at zero but a second product is not, the seller of the second product
is likely not competing directly with the seller of the first. In other words,
the two products are likely not close substitutes.
It is thus doubly inappropriate for courts to define markets based on a
hypothetical increase from zero to positive prices. Where two products are
offered at zero prices, the fact that customers would switch away from one
product and toward the other in the event of a price increase does not
necessarily indicate that the two belong in the same product market. Such
switching likely reflects nothing more than the ZPE in action. Failing to
recognize this reality is referred to herein as the "Second StreamCast
Fallacy."
In the StreamCast case discussed above, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs proposed market definition.1 45 The court's decision hinged on
its conclusion that if the seller of a given zero-pnce service were to begin
charging positive prices, users would likely switch en masse to other zero-
price services. 1 In light of the ZPE, though, the fact that such switching
would likely occur does not necessarily indicate close substitutability.
The Second StreamCast Fallacy ignores practical reality: the force of
the ZPE may cause consumers to switch to a relatively distant substitute in
the face of a price increase. To illustrate, suppose an analyst were
attempting to define the market that includes general online search. In the
face of even a "small" zero-to-positive price increase by a hypothetical
monopolist of general search, many users might substitute to remaining
zero-price alternatives, 147 perhaps increasing their use of URLs to navigate
directly to websites. Yet the likelihood of such substitution does not
necessarily indicate that the presence of URLs would discipline any
attempt by a search monopolist to acquire, exercise, or maintain market
power. Focusing solely on prices is misguided in zero-price markets,
where strategic conduct centers on nonprice aspects of competition.
144. An objection here might be that X could overcome the ZPE by offering a highly innovative,
better quality product. This is true. Yet it also suggests that the two products may not compete very
directly.
145. StreamCast Networks, Inc. v. Skype Techs., S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1095-96 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
146. Id. at 1095.
147. A similar argument is made by Kersting and Dworschak. See Christian Kersting & Sebastian
Dworschak, "Does Google Hold a Dominant Market Position?-Addressing the (Minor) Significance
of High Online User Shares, 16 IFO SCHNELLDLENST 7 (2014), translated in http://papers.ssrncom/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2495300 ("Any attempt by Google to charge a fee for search queries
would simply result in a significant loss of users.").
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The Qihoo court 1i4s correctly observed the existence of-and avoided
falling into-the Second StreamCast Fallacy. The online instant-
messaging services that constituted the relevant market in Qihoo were
offered for "free." 4 9 As the court recognized, "[u]nder this business
model, there may be a large loss in customers, which affects value-added
services and advertising revenue. If the Internet service provider increased
its basic service price, even if from free to [a] minor charge, this could
affect a vast number of users."5 o More specifically, "when the instant
messaging services are . . . free . . . and [have] become a popular business
model ... the user has very high price sensitivity. A price change, even
minor, could cause a significant decline in customers."'' Consequently, a
SSNIP test would likely cause products to be included in the relevant
market even where such products are distant substitutes for the candidate
product. 5 2 The Qihoo court correctly declined to apply a zero-to-positive
SSNIP test, avoiding the Second StreamCast Fallacy.
As a more general matter, analysts ought always to hesitate before
concluding that a zero-price product is a close substitute for a positive-
price product. And even if case-specific evidence reveals a high degree of
observed substitution between two such products, analysts should be wary
of the "Cellophane Fallacy": falsely concluding that observed substitution
at current market prices indicates lack of market power.'53 It may be that
substitution is observed because the firm offering the positive-price
product has already exercised market power to raise the price of its
product, causing marginal customers to switch to the zero-price product.
Conversely, it may be that the firm offering the zero-price product has
already exercised market power to elevate the information or attention
costs attached to its product, causing marginal customers to switch to the
positive-price product. In either case, it would be wrong to conclude on
148. Teng Xun Gongsi yu Qi Hu Gongsi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (JJ Ef $ A>
]IE }N ) [Beijing Qihoo 360 Technology Co. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co.],
(Sup. People's Ct. 2013) (China), translated in ttps://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/
DecisionTranslation.pdf. The Beijing Qihoo decision is discussed above. See also supra notes 117-21
and accompanying text.
149. Beijing Qihoo, supra note 116.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. ("In this case, HMT, using SSNIP, will probably include goods in the relevant market
which may not have [a] substitutive relationship, leading to a[] . . . wide definition of the relevant
market. Therefore, it is not suitable in this case.").
153. The Cellophane Fallacy traces back to a 1956 Supreme Court decision holding that the
defendant lacked monopoly power based on substantial observed substitution at then-current prices.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 403-04 (1956).
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the basis of observed substitution alone that the two are part of the same
product market.
Additionally, the "Reverse Cellophane Fallacy" may come into play
where a firm offers zero-price products as part of a temporary promotional
campaign.5 4 The reverse Cellophane Fallacy consists of concluding that a
firm has market power due to low observed substitution rates.' A firm
engaged in a temporary promotional campaign featuring zero-prices may
leverage the ZPE to create low demand cross-elasticities vis-a-vis other
firms' products, but that firm may not enjoy long-run market power. 5 6
Employing the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy to conclude otherwise will
lead to harmful false positives.
2. Enhanced Market Power
The competitive advantage created by the ZPE may also impact
market-power analysis. In the U.S. tradition, supply-side substitution is
typically treated separately from market definition.15 7 Instead, the potential
of such substitution factors into market-power analysis under the rubric of
"entry." 5 8
Entry analysis of zero-price markets should properly account for the
barriers to entry or expansion not only in the market for the zero-price
product, but also in the market for the interrelated product(s).1 59 Zero
prices tend to be offered by firms that produce multiple, interrelated
products.16 0 Firms offering zero-price products make their profits from the
interrelated, positive-price products they offer. If entry barriers are high in
the interrelated product market, entry into the zero-price market may be
unlikely-even if barriers are low in the zero-price product market
itself 16 A firm attempting to enter only the zero-price market would face
154. See Fabio Polverino, Hunting the Wild Geese: Competition Analysis in a World of "Free," in
CONCORRENZAE MERCATO 545, 553 (2012) (analyzing EU competition law).
155. Debra J. Aron & David E. Burnstein, Regulatory Policy and the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy,
6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 973, 987 (2010).
156. See Newman, supra note 3, at Part J.B (discussing "nonsustainable" strategies).
157. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 60, §§ 4, 9 (separating
discussions of market-definition and entry analyses).
158. See id. § 9.
159. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 38 ("To be complete, barriers to the entry of as-
efficient or more efficient firms should be recognized in all affected markets.").
160. See Evans, supra note 6, at 81-82.
161. Cf Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 18 ("Free-standing free goods might create
exclusionary effects that are quite similar to those of bundled free goods: creating a two-level entry
problem, with a rival required to enter more than one market, even if it can provide a high quality
product only in one.").
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a serious competitive disadvantage, since it would need to recoup its
investment costs via charging positive prices. The ZPE suggests that many
customers would reject any such attempt. As a result, the new entrant may
well be foreclosed both from the interrelated-product market (due to
barriers) and from turning a profit in the zero-price market (due to the
ZPE). And that, in turn, could allow an incumbent to exercise market
power, even in a market that appears on its face to have low entry
barfers. 162
This raises a related question: What, if any, entry barriers exist in zero-
price markets? In America Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, for example,
the district court concluded that it was impossible to "monopolize the
information services market because the Internet is infinite.... [A]n
entrant's ability to participate in the market . . . is without boundary."1 63
With the benefit of hindsight, however, such reasoning appears naive. Like
all markets, zero-price markets exhibit entry barriers, the types and
magnitudes of which vary widely. On one end of the spectrum lie products
like simple mobile applications, many of which are distributed at zero
prices.' Here, barriers to entry may consist of only a few thousand
dollars and a small amount of time. ' At the other end of the spectrum are
more complex products. 6 6 Consider comprehensive mapping systems like
Google Maps. Over a period of years, Google developed Maps by
acquiring several smaller firms, compiling mapping data and satellite
imagery, constructing specially outfitted camera cars, collecting over 20
petabytes (21.5 billion megabytes) of street-view imagery, integrating
ratings software, and spending untold millions on building out and
maintaining the infrastructure necessary to deliver the service to fixed and
mobile computing devices. 67  Entry on a scale that would pose a
162. Of course, where all incumbents offer zero-price goods, the ZPE is not relevant to
competition among those incumbents. Id. at 38. It does, however, remain relevant to potential entrants.
163. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d. 851, 861 (E.D. Va. 1999).
164. See, e.g., Caner Thomas, How Much Does It Cost to Develop an App? BLUECLOUD
SOLUTIONS (last updated Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bluecloudsolutions.com/blog/cost-develop-app/
(stating that many mobile applications ("apps") are distributed for "free").
165. See, e.g., id. (estimating that simple mobile apps cost between $1,000-4,000 to develop).
166. In one recent decision, the court dismissed a class-action consumer complaint alleging that
Google restrained trade in the "Internet search" market. Feitelsonv. Google, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019,
1023, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs alleged that "search engines . . . require significant
infrastructure in the form of physical plants backed by significant financial and computational
resources, as well as continuous programming support for the algorithms and software that support the
search engine, and the ability to manage search on a global scale." Id. at 1023.
167. See Leo Kelion, Google Maps Uses Ground Truth Project to Battle Apple, BBC NEWS (Sept.
10, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19536269.
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meaningful competitive constraint would require similar outlays and time
(at least given current available technology).
In addition to fixed development costs, network effects may serve to
discourage entry in zero-price markets. At least one court has refused to
dismiss a complaint where the plaintiff alleged that network effects were a
formidable barrier to entering a zero-price market. '6  Some economists
conclude that search markets, currently dominated by zero-price products,
exhibit such effects.1 6 9
C. Defenses: The "Free-Goods" Argument
The presence of zero-price goods and services tends to signal the
existence of interrelated products that subsidize the zero-price offerings.o7 0
This function of zero-price markets can open the door for a novel
argument from defendants: that imposing a restraint on one side of a two-
sided platform was necessary for offering a "free" product to consumers
on the other side of the platform. Creative though it may be, the "free-
goods defense" should fail as a matter of antitrust law and economics.i17
In United States v. American Express Co.,172 the district court correctly
rejected a free-goods defense. American Express operated a credit-card
network that functioned as a two-sided platform.1 73 On one side of the
168. See LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852,
at *8, 9 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (refusing to dismiss a complaint on market-power grounds, in part
because the plaintiff alleged that "in the market for Internet-based social networking websites, network
effects occur largely due to the 'user-generated nature' of the content on those websites").
169. See generally, e.g., Argenton & Prufer, supra note 121 (arguing that users of Internet search
engines do not account for the fact that search providers will-by virtue of the use-acquire private
information that can then be used to increase the quality of future searches, thus creating indirect
network externalities on the user side of the market).
170. See supra Part II.B.2; Evans, supra note 6, at 86.
171. Gal and Rubinfeld observe that "free goods that are part of a strategy of increasing profits in
another market .. . raise an important question: whether harm to one group of consumers might be
justified by a larger benefit to another group of consumers, in another market." They "suggest adopting
a rule which allows for some balancing." Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 40. This suggestion
appears to contemplate a different situation (some harm to some customers allows a greater amount of
benefits to other customers) than the type addressed herein-where, at most, the defendant is passing
through all of the supracompetitive profits it is earning in one market to its customers in another
market.
172. 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). To the extent it is relevant, the author represented the
United States in this matter. The discussion contained in this Article draws solely on public
information; it does not relate to or reveal any confidential information. Again, the views expressed
herein are purely the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of
Justice.
173. That payment networks are two-sided is well-established among industrial-organization
economists. For the seminal paper on the topic, see Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation
Among Competitors: Some Economics ofPayment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2002).
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platform were merchants, who paid fees to the networks in exchange for
the ability to accept credit-card payments from card-holding consumers.
On the other side of the platform were the card-holders. 7 1
American Express's contracts with merchants contained what it called
"non-discrimination provisions" (NDPs).* The NDPs "prevent[ed] the
roughly 3.4 million merchants who accept American Express credit and
charge cards from steering customers to alternative credit card brands,
such as Visa, MasterCard, and Discover. " Thus, for example, a
merchant could not "offer[] a 10% discount for using a Visa card, free
shipping for using a Discover card, or a free night at a hotel for using an
American Express card."
The district court held that the NDPs restrained competition.
Specifically, the NDPs did so by "creat[ing] an environment in which
there is nothing to offset credit card networks' incentives-including
American Express's incentive-to charge merchants inflated prices for
their services." 79 Merchants, in turn, passed these higher costs on to all of
their customers.'s0
In support of the NDPs, American Express raised the free-goods
defense. American Express argued that the NDPs were necessary to fund
American Express's "superior" card-holder rewards program.'s' As a
general matter, consumers can access credit-card services for a price of
zero-"indeed, many are essentially charged a negative price in the form
of loyalty points or other rewards." 82 Thus, American Express was
174. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 150 ("Each time a customer uses a credit card, the merchant,
in one way or another, pays a fee to the network services provider that facilitates the customer's
purchase.").
175. Id.
176. Id. at 149. Visa and MasterCard historically imposed similar rules, and the Government's
initial complaint named Visa and MasterCard as well as Amex. See id. Both Visa and MasterCard
settled without going to trial. See id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, "Justice
Department Sues American Express, MasterCard and Visa to Eliminate Rules Restricting Price
Competition; Reaches Settlement with Visa and Mastercard" (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/October/10-at-1115.html.
177. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 149-50.
178. Id. at 150.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 21 F. Supp. 3d 187, 192-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying
summary judgment) ("Defendants state that their higher fees can be explained because.... Defendants
... offer cardmember rewards and benefits that they argue are superior to those of other credit card
companies."); Christie Smythe, AmEx Executive Defends High-Fee Model as Competitive Edge,
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-28/amex-executive-
defends-high-fee-model-as-competitive-edge.html ("AmEx says ... that its high-fee model, protected
by its rules, allows it to offer generous rewards.").
182. Newman, supra note 3, at 156.
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arguing that its NDPs were necessary for it to continue offering zero- or
negative-price products-i.e., free goods-to consumers. 83 While the
argument may hold some emotional appeal, '8 4 the district court rejected it
on both legal and factual grounds.8
This outcome was correct. It is an ancient tenet of the law that
disposing of ill-gotten gains in an admirable manner is no defense.8 6
Robin Hood has no place in antitrust doctrine, wherein competition, rather
than vigilantism, is the chosen means of optimally distributing
resources.8 7 Even if a dominant firm were to pass 100 percent of its
supracompetitive profits on to consumers in the form of free products,
such "altruism" ought not give rise to a legal defense.
Antitrust economics here aligns with legal doctrine. At least since the
impact of the Chicago School was first felt in the 1970s and 1980s,8 8 and
arguably earlier,18 antitrust law has been substantially (and some would
argue primarily) concerned with allocative efficiency. Even assuming 100
percent pass-through in the form of free products, restraints on trade may
still create allocative inefficiencies, regardless of whether the net output of
a platform increases or decreases.
To use operating systems (OSs) as an example, assume that a
monopolist controlling 100% of OS platforms were to impose a restraint
of trade on application developers. Suppose further that the restraint
allowed the monopolist to charge those developers supracompetitive
prices for access to the OS (i.e., for the ability to develop programs
183. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d. at 226.
184. Id. at 227 (calling American Express's proferred justification "perhaps intuitively
appealing").
185. Id. ("Defendants' putative justification is inconsistent with both the law and the factual
record.").
186. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Justice is
not served by inflicting injustice. The ends do not justify the means. There is no 'Robin Hood' defense
to illegal and wrongful conduct."); cf Microsoft Corp. v. Comput. Support Servs. of Carolina, Inc.,
123 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (rejecting argument that alleged theft of a competitor's
intellectual property was appropriate in light of competitor's alleged anticompetitive conduct).
187. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990) (condemning fee-
fixing agreement among lawyers, despite the possibility that "the quality of representation may
improve when rates are increased"); see also Jon Polenberg, Comment, tfosorciM and croMiftos: Why
High-Technology Antitrust Inquiry Is Backwards and Inside-Out, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1275, 1294
(2003) ("Robin Hood is guilty of theft. Whether he is performing his theft under the guise of providing
for the poor does not change the illegality of his acts. The illegality and serving-the-poor inquiries are
separate and should stay that way.").
188. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 215 (1985)
("The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates that allocative efficiency as defined by the
market should be the only goal of the antitrust laws.").
189. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (referring to "allocation" of
economic resources).
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compatible with the OS). Finally, suppose that the monopolist were to pass
through 100% of those rents to users, in the form of zero-price OSs.
In this scenario, the restraint would cause a higher number of users to
demand OSs, putting upward pressure on OS output. Users would, in
isolation, benefit from this scenario; it is that benefit that supposedly
justifies the free-goods defense. But the restraint would also cause a lower
number of developers to create programs for the OS, putting downward
pressure on OS output.
Crucially, the restraint would create allocative inefficiencies regardless
of whether net output of the OS were to increase or decrease. Society
would devote an inefficiently low amount of resources to producing
applications; it would also devote an inefficiently high amount of
resources to consuming OSs. Antitrust law condemns such outcomes. At
the core of the antitrust enterprise lies the assumption that unrestrained
competitive forces, not the whims of firms with market power, "yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress."l90
E. Damages Valuations
Valuing damages for antitrust harms is often difficult, but it is also
essential. First, and most obviously, courts awarding damages to private
plaintiffs must arrive at some valuation to make the awards. Second,
private litigants deciding whether to settle must estimate the size of a
potential damages award, discounted by the probability of liability. Third,
public enforcement agencies must estimate harm in order to apply an
error-cost framework to decide whether to seek a remedy for potential
violations.
In the United States, private plaintiffs (but not the Government)191 may
recover monetary damages if they successfully prove an antitrust
violation. Having proved an antitrust injury that caused them harm,
antitrust plaintiffs still bear the burden of establishing the amount of
damages. The basic objective when calculating antitrust damages is to
make the plaintiff whole-to recreate the world as it would have existed
had the defendant not violated the antitrust laws.1 92
190. Id.
191. In 2011, the Antitrust Division for the first time obtained court approval for a settlement
involving disgorgement of the defendant's profits. United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d
633 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Damages, however, remain unavailable to public enforcers.
192. In antitrust law, actual damages awards, once calculated, are trebled. The goals of the
additional 200 percent windfall have been stated as, variously, incentivizing private antitrust
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As the Court has observed, "[t]he vagaries of the marketplace usually
deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiffs situation would have been in
the absence of the defendant's antitrust violation." 93 Yet, the equitable
intuition is that it would be unjust to allow defendants to escape liability
by insisting that plaintiffs prove with specificity the amount of harm the
defendants themselves inflicted.1 9 4 These principles have led courts to
apply a fairly relaxed standard to private antitrust plaintiffs attempting to
prove the amount of their damages claims.195
1. Monetary Damages in Zero-Price Markets
In zero-price markets, quantifying antitrust damages with a high degree
of accuracy will generally be difficult. The "vagaries of the marketplace"
noted by the Court in 1981 are no less present in modem zero-price
settings. They may well be more intractable today.
To the extent customers seek damages for harms from attentional or
informational overcharges, the complexity of proof increases significantly.
For all the reasons that economists use price as an easy stand-in for more
complicated competitive functions like quality or innovation-and
because damages (like prices) comprise money-prices also facilitate
damages calculations.
The shift to zero-price markets can thus take antitrust damages
calculations away from an accounting-style exercise and toward something
more akin to measuring damages for pain and suffering or loss of
consortium. That shift is potentially problematic. Damages awards for
such nonmonetary harms, and for pain and suffering in particular, have
been heavily criticized as allowing judges and (especially) juries too much
discretion. And in the antitrust field, juries have already become the object
of much skepticism.196
enforcement. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) ("By offering potential
litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their damages, Congress encouraged
these persons to serve as 'private attorneys general."'); deterring anticompetitive conduct, see Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); and dispossessing violators of "the fruits of their
illegality," see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
193. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981).
194. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379
(1927) ("[A] defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise
damages suffered by the plaintiff, [sic] is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with
the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible.").
195. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
196. See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury, in THE INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 109 (2011) ("No U.S. antitrust institution is more maligned
than the jury."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 4
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Thus, on the one hand, accurately calculating damages awards in
antitrust cases involving zero-price markets may be quite difficult. The
nature of the harms to be remedied may require nonspecialist judges and
juries to exercise a greater-than-ideal degree of discretion. On the other
hand, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out decades ago that "[t]he constant
tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be
awarded where a wrong has been done," and that "[d]ifficulty of
ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery for a proven
invasion of the plaintiff s rights." 9 7
2. Damages-Valuation Approaches
The questions of whether and how to grant antitrust damages in zero-
price markets thus depend on whether some workable, if inexact, metric
can be used to quantify the harm to be remedied. One such metric,
proposed herein, is the "marketplace valuation" method. This metric
contains an inherent shortcoming, yet alternative damages-calculation
methods exhibit unique deficiencies that render them much more
unreliable.
a. Marketplace Valuation
The marketplace-valuation approach would look to the per-unit value
of the relevant information or attention to either the defendant (if used
internally) or the third-party customers who buy the information or
attention.1 98 The per-unit value is then multiplied by the number of units of
information or attention that constitutes the violation-related overcharge.
(2005) ("Jury trials in front of intelligent but nonspecialist judges is a truly miserable way to make
economic policy."). Hovenkamp contends that neither of the two functions juries traditionally serve in
the U.S. judicial system-evaluating the veracity of witness testimony and delineating community
moral standards-are relevant in the antitrust context. Id. at 48.
197. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (quoting Story Parchment
Co., 282 U.S. at 565) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. A somewhat analogous damages-calculation method is the "factor income" or "derived
value" approach sometimes used to measure harm to natural resources. This approach "is used as a
means of valuation in applications where natural resources are used as inputs in the production of other
goods and services." C.A. Ulibarri & K.F. Wellman, Natural Resource Valuation: A Primer on
Concepts and Techniques 23, prepared for U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY (1997). It considers the increase in
costs due to the natural-resource harm-holding all else constant-that are incurred by the firm(s) who
use the natural resource as a production input. Id. at 23-24.
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To illustrate, suppose that firm A competes with several rivals in the
market for online social-scrapbooking platforms.' 99 A's scrapbooking
service is a zero-price product as to users, who pay via attention costs by
viewing advertisements while using the service. A makes its revenue by
selling advertising space to third parties.200 A is able to sell 100 units of
advertising to third parties at the competitive per-unit price of $1.
Suppose now that A acquires a monopoly and exercises its power by
engaging in exclusionary conduct that allows A to extract from consumers
more attention costs than it could have gained otherwise. A is now able to
sell 110 units of advertising to third parties at a per-unit price of $1.
Though the price to users remains zero, users incur relatively higher
attention costs. Under the marketplace-valuation approach, the measure of
harm is the difference between the amount actually paid by advertisers and
the amount they would have paid A if A had not engaged in the
anticompetitive conduct: $10.
The marketplace-valuation approach thus incorporates the actual
marketplace value of attention. Its primary advantage is objectivity: the
"relevant data" on which triers of fact could base a "just and reasonable
estimate" of harm 201 comprises revealed preferences by actual market
participants.
But this approach is inexact. As the above example indicates, it is a
measure of what the attention was worth to advertisers, not necessarily the
attention costs to consumers. To continue the example, suppose that a
massive recession causes all of A's advertisers to lower the per-unit price
they are willing to pay for users' attention from $1 to $0.90, but does not
affect consumers' willingness to incur attention costs in exchange for
using P's service.202 Going forward, A, which retains its monopoly status,
could keep the attention-cost level on the consumer side constant at 110
units. Thus, consumers would experience the same effective amount of
attention costs: the amount of harm would remain constant. Yet the
199. This example is not meant to suggest that the Internet-based scrapbooking platform market is
a relevant antitrust market, or that any particular firm wields market power in that market.
200. A real-life online scrapbooking platform, Pinterest, generated its first revenue by introducing
advertising to the user experience. See Douglas MacMillan, Pinterest CEO Lays Out Growth Plan,
Sees Revenue in 2014, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304027204579334651169493632.
201. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969) (quoting Bigelow v.
RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946)).
202. In fact, a recession might increase consumers' willingness to incur attention costs by
decreasing the amount of money available to the consumers for discretionary spending.
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amount actually paid by advertisers-the variable used to calculate
damages-would decrease.
Depending on the contours of the particular market at issue, variant
market-based valuation methods are available, though they tend to suffer
from similar defects. Consumers of the zero-price version of freemium
products, for example, may point to the positive-price version of the
relevant product as the appropriate metric for measuring damages. 203 To
illustrate, suppose a firm were to offer two versions of the same service: a
zero-pnce option that allowed the firm to collect personal information
from users and a positive-price option that did not.204 Users of the zero-
price version might argue that the amounts paid by positive-price users
represent the value of the information. But this argument is not quite
correct-those amounts represent the value to a different user group of not
surrendering their information, and different individuals attach varying
values to their personal information.205
Such market-based valuation metrics are decoupled from actual harm
as compared to the more traditional price-based damages-calculation
metrics. But the ultimate question in awarding damages is not whether this
(or any other) measure is mathematically exact. Antitrust plaintiffs have
an obligation to come forward with the best, most accurate measure of
damages that is reasonably available.,,206 The marketplace-valuation
metric is based on what the actual exchanged attention or information
costs were worth in an actual marketplace, or what avoiding the costs was
worth to some set of actual customers. It thus exhibits at least some degree
of objectivity and depends on revealed, not stated, preferences-a crucial
advantage, given the unique shortcomings of stated preferences in zero-
price markets.
b. Stated Preferences and Cognitive Biases
Other metrics might be used to attempt to measure more directly the
value of attention and information costs to consumers. Plaintiffs could, for
203. This basic business model ("freemium") is already widely used with advertising-supported
services. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 3, at 157.
204. This hypothetical is not far-fetched-in 2015, AT&T announced a new fiber-optic Internet
service that allowed users to pay an additional $29 per month to "avoid being tracked" while using the
service. See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Thomas Gryta, AT&T Offers Data Privacy-for a Price, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 18, 2015, 6:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/18/att-offers-data-privacy-for-a-price/
?mod=WSJ TechWSJD NeedToKnow.
205. See Newman, supra note 3, at 181.
206. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1399, 1406 (D. Ariz.
1990); accord S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 1090 (D.D.C. 1960).
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example, introduce survey evidence purporting to quantify that value
based on respondents' answers to a questionnaire. Conducting and
analyzing such studies has become increasingly commonplace in the
environmental-law context, 207 where this methodology is known as the
"contingent valuation" approach.208 Survey research, however, consists of
stated preferences. Stated preferences (what people say they want) stand in
contrast to revealed preferences (what people actually want, as
demonstrated by real-world behavior). 20 9 And neoclassical economics-
which provides the backbone of modem antitrust economics-strongly
210favors analysis based on revealed, rather than stated, preferences.
Myriad cognitive biases and limitations put an upward bound on how
accurately respondents can answer questions about the monetary value of
attention and information costs. Research in this area shows a divide
between perceived and actual costs-between stated and revealed
preferences.
When asked about their preferences, individuals appear to overestimate
their sensitivity to information costs. Thus, for example, "Americans say
they are deeply concerned about privacy on the web and their
cellphones.... Yet they keep using the services and handing over their
personal information. "21 When asked, consumers voice their support for
privacy-protection measures-but their "concern appears to have had little
discernible impact on [their] shopping behaviors."2 12 Researchers have
207. See Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 609, 656 (2014) ("Because of the prevalence of difficult-to-measure goods in the environmental
field, '[i]t is hard to overestimate the central importance of contingent valuation to modem
environmental economics."' (quoting Richard T. Carson & W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent
Valuation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 821, 826 (Karl-Gdran Miler & Jeffrey
R. Vincent eds., 2005)).
208. See Ulibarri & Wellman, supra note 198, at 25 ("The most obvious way to measure
nonmarket values is to ask people how much they would be willing to pay for the resource or avoid
any damages that might be sustained by the resource.").
209. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 701 n.99 (2013) ("Economists speak of 'revealed preferences.' They
maintain that people's preferences are shown, not by what they say, but by what they do.").
210. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2012) (stating
that "neoclassical economic theory depends" on "the link between revealed preference and individual
welfare").
211. Claire Cain Miller, Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act As if They Don't, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot/americans-say-they-want-privacy-but-
act-as-if-they-dont.html?_r-0&abt=0002&abg=1.
212. Joseph Phelps, Glen Nowak & Elizabeth Ferrell, Privacy Concerns and Consumer
Willingness to Provide Personal Information, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 27, 27 (2000).
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dubbed this the "privacy paradox." 213 Empirical research indicates that the
gap is substantial. In one study, individuals stated their willingness to
disclose an average of 8.7 items of personal information-yet, several
weeks later, actually disclosed nearly twice that number.2 14 When it comes
to information costs, individuals "say one thing (intend to limit disclosure)
and then do another (actually provide personal details)." 2 15
On the other hand, individuals appear to underestimate attention costs.
One study showed that Internet users as a whole believe online
advertisements to be "almost completely ineffective."216 In fact, almost
half of users reported that advertisements have "no effect whatsoever,"
stating a belief that they were essentially invulnerable to advertisements.2 17
This belief was incorrect. Follow-up experiments involving anagram word
problems surrounded by varying numbers and types of advertisements
demonstrated that "peripheral ads had substantial persuasive and subtle
distracting effects." 218 i short, research shows that "consumers
underestimate the effects that on-line advertisements have on them." 2 19
There are vagaries inherent in any of these valuation methodologies.
The pronounced divergence between stated and revealed preferences
regarding information and attention costs, however, ought to make courts
particularly wary of placing much weight on contingent valuations in
antitrust cases involving zero-price markets.
3. Disgorgement as an Alternative to Damages
Disgorgement, an equitable remedy that transfers an undeserved
benefit from a defendant to a plaintiff (or class), may serve as an
alternative to awarding damages for some antitrust harms involving zero-
price markets. Disgorgement does not require plaintiffs to offer a
calculation of harm. 22 0 Although disgorgement has rarely been invoked in
litigated antitrust cases, "there is surprisingly little doubt that equitable
antitrust remedies include requiring violators to disgorge any illegally
213. Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Home & David A. Home, The Privacy Paradox: Personal
Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 100 (2007).
214. Id. at 112-13. These results were observed in a fairly small sample size, twenty-three
individuals. Id. at 110.
215. Id. at 101.
216. Brad J. Sagarin et al., Bartering Our Attention: The Distraction and Persuasion Effects of
On-Line Advertisements, 8 COGNITIVE TECH. 4, 5 (2003).
217. Id. at 5.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Id. at 16.
220. See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 81 (2009).
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obtained profits." 2 21 The FTC has successfully sought disgorgement as an
antitrust remedy in a handful of cases. 22 2 And, for the first time in 2011,
the Department of Justice successfully pursued disgorgement as a remedy
for a Sherman Act violation. 22 3
Disgorgement offers both advantages and disadvantages as compared
to awarding damages. The immediate advantage is that of demonstrability.
As Elhauge points out, "even where this [disgorgement] analysis is
difficult, it may well be easier to calculate the amount of illicit profits than
it is to calculate the amount of harm to each victim." 22 4 This is doubly true
in the zero-price context: although the relevant harms may be
nonmonetary, defendants' profits will always be expressed in dollar terms.
On the other hand, disgorgement explicitly does not seek to compensate
victims for their injuries. And in the antitrust context, the important
functions served by the trebling of damages go unmet where courts apply
only equitable remedies (like disgorgement). Yet despite these limitations,
where zero prices render damages calculations impossible or overly
unreliable, disgorgement may be the next-best option.
4. The Role ofPublic Enforcement
In some instances, no measure of damages may be reasonably
available. Given finite resources, antitrust plaintiffs may not be able to
offer a damages valuation that meets even the relaxed standard for
antitrust damages. Even well-heeled plaintiffs may struggle to untangle
complex zero-price business models. Accordingly, damages valuations
submitted in zero-price contexts may veer into the mere "speculation or
guesswork" condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court.225
As a result, public antitrust enforcers should pay special attention to
such markets. Where proving damages is unworkable, injunctive relief
remains available. The reality, however, is that private antitrust
enforcement would be nearly nonexistent absent the prospect of damages
for successful plaintiffs. Private plaintiffs often are best situated to detect
antitrust violations.226 Yet, in complex zero-price scenarios, there is a real
221. Id. at 79.
222. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 286 n.11
(2007) (collecting cases).
223. See generally United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
224. Elhauge, Disgorgement, supra note 220, at 81.
225. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
226. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) ("Congress created the treble-damages
remedy . . . precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These
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danger that the relatively dismal prospects of damages recovery will, in
practice, prevent any private enforcement, thereby leaving such markets
under-policed. Public antitrust enforcement is most crucial in markets
where private enforcement is least likely to be effective.
III. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS
The discussion turns now to the particular types of strategic conduct
that have been, are, or may soon be challenged in zero-price markets. As
to each category of conduct, this Part is, by turns, both descriptive and
prescriptive. Each Subpart attempts to collect and report objectively all
extant case law involving the particular type of conduct addressed. Where
no case law yet exists, illustrative hypotheticals are posed. Additionally,
normative critique of courts' decision-making is woven into each
discussion: errors and potential pitfalls are identified, and guidance for
future analyses is offered.
A. Price and Cost Fixing
Horizontal cartel activity has long been at the core of antitrust
liability. 2 27 Because of their high likelihood of causing anticompetitive
harm, agreements among direct competitors that involve naked price
fixing, joint output limitation, and market-allocation are generally treated
as per se illegal. 228 This per se rule "condemns conduct without proof of
power, effect, or purpose and without hearing claims of legitimate
objectives." 22 9 Conspiring competitors may face hefty fines and even
prison sentences.
Zero-price markets present two challenges for the treatment of
horizontal agreements. First, should agreements among horizontal
competitors to fix the price of a product at zero be treated similarly to
agreements to fix positive prices-i.e., should horizontal zero-price-fixing
private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of
Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.").
227. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 798 (1987) (referring to "an inner core of antitrust cases, for example,
those involving horizontal price-fixing, where liability is unambiguous").
228. This treatment is justified by basic economic theory. A group of firms acting together faces
the same incentive to raise prices and reduce output as a single-firm monopolist. And an agreement to
act jointly is a quick and low-cost way to acquire market power relative to the aggressive competition
or predatory conduct required of a single firm wishing to acquire such power.
229. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1509a.
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be per se illegal? Second, how should antitrust law address horizontal
agreements to fix attention or information cost levels?
1. Zero-Price Fixing
If horizontal cartel activity lies at the core of antitrust liability, then
horizontal price fixing lies at the very heart of that core. As the leading
treatise observes, the rationale for treating horizontal price fixing that is
not ancillary to joint productive activity 2 30 as per se illegal hinges on both
the high likelihood that such price-fixing will impose anticompetitive
harms and the low likelihood that it will yield net social benefits.23 The
consensus is that any "conceivable social benefits are few in principle,
small in magnitude, speculative in occurrence, and always premised on the
existence of price-fixing power that is likely to be exercised adversely to
the public."232
Horizontal zero-price fixing challenges the consensus view. The
likelihood that such price fixing will impose anticompetitive harms or
yield social benefits varies greatly depending on the market context of the
challenged agreement. More specifically, supplier agreements to set
customer-facing prices at zero create little risk of harm and a high
likelihood of societal benefits. But agreements among buyers to fix prices
to suppliers at zero carries a relatively high risk of harm and low
likelihood of societal benefits. Antitrust rules, thus, ought to be lenient
toward the former and wary of the latter.
When suppliers agree to set customer-facing prices at zero, the core
concern motivating the per se rule against horizontal price fixing-that
competitors will set prices higher than the competitive level, reducing
output and harming customers-is ameliorated. As Gal and Rubinfeld
suggest, "the motivation to supply a free good plays a significant role ...
it is a helpful and efficient first step when analyzing the welfare effects of
free goods."233 An agreement among suppliers to set prices at zero is less
likely than an agreement to set prices at some positive level to be
230. Id. The per se prohibition of horizontal price fixing is not universal. As discussed further
infra note 242, Broadcast Music carved out an exception from the per se rule against naked horizontal
price fixing for restraints of trade that facilitate joint productive activity that would not have otherwise
occurred.
231. See AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1509a.
232. Id. ¶ 1509a.
233. Gal &Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 31.
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motivated by the lure of supracompetitive profits.234 And unlike maximum
price fixing, there is generally no danger that the "ceiling" will serve also
as a de facto "floor." Unless sellers had been charging negative prices-
paying customers to take their products-imposing fixed zero prices
without more is an unalloyed good. Since negative prices are quite rare in
practice, the likelihood of harm is also rare. Furthermore, as discussed
further below, the conceivable social benefits yielded by horizontal zero-
price fixing agreements are relatively greater in number and magnitude,
and less speculative in nature than those attendant to similar agreements in
positive-price markets .235 These differences militate against treating
horizontal zero-price fixing by suppliers as per se illegal.236  Such
agreements are to be distinguished, however, from other supplier cartel
agreements (e.g., market-allocation agreements) that merely happen to
involve zero-price products.
Wallace v. IBM 238 provides an instructive example of benign (and,
indeed, beneficial) horizontal zero-price fixing agreements among
suppliers. Wallace involved an allegation of horizontal zero-price fixing
by suppliers. Linux, an open-source OS, was distributed under the GNU
General Public License (GPL). Among other things, the GPL allowed
users to prepare-but prevented them from charging positive prices for-
derivative works. 23 9 The plaintiff wanted to compete with Linux by
creating a derivative of it or an entirely new OS; he contended that various
entities involved in the Linux project had conspired to prevent such
competition "by making Linux available at an unbeatable price."240 Yet as
Bond points out, "the GPL coordinates the work of thousands of
programmers, with at least thousands looking to download the software
234. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 8 ("[JI]t is important to realize that a growing number
of goods are provided free of charge based on motivations that are intrinsic and not purely
economic.").
235. Cf United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93 ("[B]ecause of the pervasively
innovative character of platform software markets, tying in such markets may produce efficiencies that
courts have not previously encountered and thus the Supreme Court had not factored into the per se
rule as originally conceived.").
236. Cf AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1509a.
237. Thus, for example, a district court applied the per se rule to a territorial market-allocation
scheme involving the provision of online Yellow Pages services. The fact that the defendants used an
ad-supported zero-price delivery model did not ameliorate the likely purpose and effect of the
agreement. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44-45 (D.D.C.
1998).
238. Wallace v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006).
239. Id. at 1105.
240. Id. at 1106.
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that they produce." 24 1 Thus, the GPL was ancillary to joint productive
activity, much like the blanket licenses at issue in Broadcast Music. 24 2 In
fact, by eliminating the requirement of payment altogether, the GPL may
have done even more to reduce transaction costs than did the blanket
licenses in Broadcast Music. Seeing no evil-and much good-in the
GPL, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of Wallace's complaint.243
Agreements by buyers to fix supplier-facing prices at zero carry with
them a much greater potential risk of harm than supplier agreements like
the GPL in Wallace. Because buyer-side zero-price fixing agreements tend
to lower costs, they are likely motivated by desire to extract
supracompetitive profits.244 At the same time, such agreements are less
likely to be motivated primarily by the desire to engage in joint productive
activity that would not be possible absent agreement.
The NCAA's rules forbidding certain forms of student-athlete
compensation at issue in O 'Bannon v. NCAA 2 45 can be analyzed as an
example of buyer-side horizontal zero-price fixing.246 The NCAA, a
cooperative joint venture, was established to regulate intercollegiate
sports. 2 47 At issue in O 'Bannon were NCAA-promulgated rules that
prevented member schools from (among other things) compensating
student-athletes "for the use of their names, images, and likenesses" in
various media.2 48 Essentially, as the district court pointed out, "the schools
agree[d] to value [such uses] at zero by agreeing not to compete with each
241. Heidi S. Bond, Note, What's So GreatAbout Nothing? The GNU General Public License and
the Zero-Price-Fixing Problem, 104 MICH. L. REv. 547, 559 (2005).
242. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the U.S.
Supreme Court applied a rule of reason analysis to a blanket-licensing scheme created by two joint
ventures, ASCAP and BMI. Broadcast-radio stations wanted to play copyrighted songs; individual
composers wanted their songs to be played. Id. at 4-6. Yet transacting on an individualized basis
would be ruinously time-consuming. Id. at 5. ASCAP and BMI solved this market failure by creating a
blanket license: stations could play any song in ASCAP and BMI's libraries in exchange for a small
license fee, fixed by the joint ventures. Id. Thus, although the blanket licenses comprised horizontal
price-fixing agreements, the price-fixing was ancillary to joint productive activity (creating substantial
net benefits for society) and received rule-of-reason treatment as a result. Id. at 22-24.
243. Wallace v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 F.2d. at 1107-08.
244. Again, when it comes to designing antitrust rules to address zero-price products ("free
goods"), motives matter. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 31.
245. O'Bannonv. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
246. The court generally characterized the schools as sellers in the "college education market," but
recognized that the NCAA student recruits "could also be characterized as sellers in an almost
identical market for their athletic services and licensing rights." Id. at 973.
247. Id. at 963.
248. Id.
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other." 2 49 Though the NCAA contended that its zero-price fixing created
unique social benefits,25 0 the court-applying a rule-of-reason analysis-
concluded that the challenged rules yielded only "limited procompetitive
benefits" that could have been achieved through less restrictive means.25 '
The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the district court's opinion, holding that
the schools' agreement "to value the athletes' NILs at zero" was
anticompetitive .252
O'Bannon demonstrates that buyer agreements to fix prices at zero may
be anticompetitive. But per se rules are applied to ban certain types of
anticompetitive conduct only when courts have developed enough
institutional experience analyzing such conduct to conclude with
confidence that it carries a high likelihood of harm and low likelihood of
benefits.25 3 Whatever the merits (if any) of applying the per se rule to
horizontal zero-price fixing, courts currently have insufficient experience
with such agreements to justify such a rule. The rule of reason offers
courts-like those that issued the O'Bannon decisions-the flexibility
needed to avoid condemning innocent conduct when grappling with
unfamiliar business arrangements, making it the appropriate method of
analyzing horizontal zero-price fixing. And the rule of reason itself can be
tailored to fit the case at hand.254 Basic economic theory suggests leniency
toward supplier-side zero-price fixing agreements. Conversely, courts
should take a harder look at buyer-side agreements, though a per se rule
presently remains inappropriate.
2. Information- or Attention-Cost Fixing
A second question raised by horizontal agreements in zero-pnice
markets is how antitrust law ought to address agreements to fix attention
or information cost levels. Given that information and attention often serve
the same function as money in zero-price markets, should such agreements
trigger the same rule of per se liability as price-fixing cartel activity? Or
249. Id. at 973.
250. Id. ("The NCAA asserts that the challenged restrictions on student-athlete compensation are
reasonable because they are necessary to preserve its tradition of amateurism, maintain competitive
balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams, promote the integration of academics
and athletics, and increase the total output of its product.").
251. Id. at 1007.
252. O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("It is only after
considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se
violations of the Sherman Act.").
254. See California Dental Ass'nv. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
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are "cost fixing" agreements either sufficiently novel or likely to create
unique benefits so as to warrant rule-of-reason treatment?
No U.S. court to date appears to have faced the question. For a real-
world illustration, consider the contemporaneous privacy policy changes
made by some of the largest firms then providing online search services.
In 2008, Google "halved the amount of time it store[d] personal data to
nine months."255 In December 2008, Microsoft announced256 that it was
willing to shorten the length of time after which it would anonymize users'
data from eighteen months to six months-provided that "its rivals did the
same." 257 A few weeks later, Yahoo! announced that it would anonymize
its users' data after three months.258
Harbour and Koslov identify this as an example of information-cost
competition.259 Yet a slightly altered set of facts might have suggested a
conspiracy. Suppose that, in response to Google's announcement of a
lower nine-month policy, Microsoft had announced that it was willing to
adopt a six-month policy if its competitors also did so-and that, within a
few weeks, both Yahoo! and Google had announced moves to a six-month
policy. 2 60 Such behavior could be interpreted as (1) an invitation to enter
an agreement to fix information costs at a given (maximum) level,
followed by (2) agreement by the soliciting firm's rivals, as evidenced by
their conduct. If competitors were to engage in such behavior vis-a-vis
prices, their conduct would likely be a per se violation of Sherman Act
S1.261 Under U.S. antitrust law, even agreements to fix maximum prices
*262
are per se illegal.
255. Kim Dixon, Yahoo Cuts Data Retention to Three Months, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2008, 4:25
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/17/us-yahoo-data-idUSTRE4BG2VP20081217 [https://
perma.cc/HB2A-QKZF].
256. David Burt, Microsoft Supports Strong Industry Search Data Anonymization Standards,
TECHNET (Dec. 8, 2008, 6:23 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/privacyimperative/archive/2008/12/08/
microsoft-supports-strong-industry-search-data-anonymization-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/ TA3R-
W4BF]. The announcement was made in response to a Europe Commission working group's opinion
requesting Internet search companies to "adopt strong anonymization after 6 months." Id.
257. Dixon, supra note 255.
258. Id.
259. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded
Vision ofRelevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 793-94 (2010).
260. And suppose further that Microsoft's announcement was not in reaction to the European
Commission's working group opinion discussed supra note 256.
261. Cf Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 923-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(describing a meeting during which a representative of one rival firm "indicated to his competitors his
preference for established prices in the industry," followed by adoption of substantially similar, higher
prices).
262. See Arizonav. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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At least in theory, a cartel could enter into an agreement to fix
information or attention costs at a supracompetitive level.263 Applying the
per se rule to such agreements would nonetheless be premature. Courts
have not yet developed sufficient institutional knowledge to conclude with
certainty that these cost-fixing agreements carry the same (or a
substantially similar) high likelihood of harm and low likelihood of social
benefits as traditional cartel activity. It may well be that cost-fixing
agreements offer unique social benefits. Consider, for example, a group of
broadcast-television stations that wish to televise both programming and
advertisements. Some of the stations demand new programming; others
seek (presumably lower-cost) syndicated programming. Because a given
program may ultimately be aired on several different channels, it would
benefit all involved parties to adopt established time-slots (e.g., thirty
minutes) within which a given amount of time would be devoted to
programming (e.g., twenty minutes) and the remainder would be devoted
to advertisements. With such an agreement in place, program creators
could confidently produce twenty-minute episodes that any station could
conveniently syndicate. Horizontal attention-cost fixing agreements may
thus create social benefits; the frequency with which they do so remains to
be seen. Absent substantial experience evaluating such agreements, rule-
of-reason treatment is appropriate.
B. Tying
Tying arrangements are nominally per se illegal under U.S. antitrust
law. In practice, however, proving a tying claim requires demonstrating
five elements: (1) two separate products; (2) the supplier conditions the
sale of one product (the "tying" product) on the customer's also acquiring
the second product (the "tied" product); (3) the supplier has substantial
power in the market for the tying product; (4) the arrangement is likely to
substantially harm competition; and (5) a "not insubstantial volume of
commerce is affected." 26 4 Element (2) is sometimes called the "coercion"
element.265 When the coercion element is accomplished via contract, the
supplier engages in "contractual" tying; when the coercion element is
263. Such agreements may well be rare in practice-heterogeneity makes coordination more
difficult. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 242 (2013). Information
costs (in particular) and attention costs tend to be heterogeneous, frustrating the formation and
monitoring of horizontal agreements to fix them. See Newman, supra note 3, at 178-79.
264. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1702.
265. See, e.g., R & G Affiliates, Inc. v. Knoll Int'l, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1395, 1399 (1984) (referring
to the "coercion element").
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accomplished via technological interdependence, the supplier engages in
"technological" tying. 2 66 Contractual ties trigger a unique set of rules that
raise challenges for zero-price applications.267  Technological ties,
however, generally fall under Sherman Act § 2 and are treated under the
traditional monopolization standard, which does not present such
challenges. 2 68 Thus, this Part focuses on contractual ties.
As to contractual tying arrangements, the primary challenge raised by
zero-price markets relates to U.S. Supreme Court precedent referring to
"sales" and "purchases." The Court has repeatedly described the conduct
that satisfies the coercion element of a tying violation as "conditioning
[the] sale of one commodity on the purchase of another." 26 9 The questions
thus raised are (1) whether satisfying the coercion element of a tying
violation requires proving a conditioned "sale"; (2) if so, whether a zero-
price transaction can satisfy the "sale" requirement; and (3) if not, whether
a zero-pnce transaction can satisfy the coercion element.
At least one court has squarely held that the coercion element does
require a "sale," and that zero-price transactions fail to qualify as such. In
Stephen Jay Photography, local commercial photographers alleged that a
group of large, national commercial photographers had entered into illegal
tying arrangements in the Norfolk, Virginia area.2 70 The defendants had
contracted with all of the high schools in the area to take yearbook
photographs of students. While taking the yearbook photos, the defendants
also took portrait photos.27 1 At least according to the district court,272 the
yearbook photos were provided "at no charge" to the students; the portraits
were not.2 73 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, reasoning
that "a tying arrangement cannot exist when the tying product is not sold
266. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1757a (discussing the difference between
contractual and technological tying).
267. See id. ¶ 1702 (relating the black-letter legal elements of a contractual tying violation).
268. See id. 1757a ("Most challenges to technological ties are made under § 2 of the Sherman
Act.").
269. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-13 (1984) (emphasis added)
(quoting Times-Picayune Pub'g v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953)); accord N. Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 (1958); see also id. at 5 ("[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product."); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independ. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46
(2006) (holding that patents do not create a presumption of market power in markets for tying
products).
270. Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 990 (4th Cir. 1990).
271. Id.
272. The appellate court read the record to indicate that one of the defendants did charge a
"nominal fee" to "some senior students" for the yearbook photos. Id. at 991.
273. Id.
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to the consumer, but is provided free of charge."274 Using a similar
analysis to address inverse facts (positive-price tying product, zero-price
tied product), a court applying state unfair-competition law dismissed a
complaint that alleged a tying scheme involving broadcast television. 27 5
The proper understanding of the coercion element, however, focuses on
the question of coercion itself-not on a formalistic inquiry into whether
there was a "sale," however defined. As the Supreme Court explained in
Jefferson Parish, "not every refusal to sell two products separately can be
said to restrain competition."276 It is not suppliers' requiring a concurrent
"sale" (or "purchase") per se that threatens anticompetitive harm. Instead,
it is the presence of coercion-as the leading treatise puts it, the threat of
harm occurs where "[t]he customer takes the second . . . product from the
defendant, not because he prefers it but only because he must take it in
order to obtain a desired . . .product, either at all or on favorable terms."277
Where the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to the coercion element as
the "conditioning" of a "sale," it has done so when analyzing traditional,
positive-price markets.2 78 The language of Sherman Act § 1, on which
zero-price tying claims would likely be predicated, 27 9 requires only a
"contract," not a "sale." 28 0 And courts applying the common law of
contracts have long recognized that zero-price agreements predicated on
one party's exchanging information281 or attention282 can be valid
contracts. 283 Thus, the question of whether zero-price transactions are
"sales" for purposes of tying analysis (which the Stephen Jay Photography
court incorrectly treated as dispositive) is immaterial. 28 4
274. Id. (appearing to quote the district court's decision without attribution (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The appellate court affirmed on somewhat different grounds, basing its reasoning on
the fact that the defendants did not require students to purchase portrait photos, but rather made
yearbook photos available with or without a portrait purchase). Id.
275. See Morrisonv. Viacom, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
276. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984).
277. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1702.
278. Even the Stephen Jay Photography court prefaced its quoting of such language with the
qualifier "[t]ypically." Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 991.
279. Clayton Act § 3 prohibits tying, but-unlike Sherman Act § 1-§ 3 explicitly requires a "sale
or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities." 15
U.S.C. § 14 (2012). Since tying claims can also be pursued under Sherman Act § 1, plaintiffs can be
expected to avoid the "sale" issue by filing under § 1.
280. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
281. E.g., Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel and Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
282. E.g., Jennings v. Radio Station KSCS, 708 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tex. App. 1986).
283. See Newman, supra note 3, at 172 (arguing that such precedent supports the conclusion that
attention and information costs may be exchanged, bringing zero-price transactions within the scope of
the antitrust laws).
284. What constitutes a "sale" for broader legal purposes is an open question Article 2 of the
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Given that the coercion element does not hinge on whether there was a
"sale," it is immaterial whether zero-price transactions involve "sales" or
"purchases." Rather, the question is whether coercion itself can occur.
Coercion may be present where one of the products in a tying arrangement
is offered at a price of zero. In Lucas Industries, Inc., for example, the
court rightly rejected the defendant's argument that coercion was lacking
because the tying product was offered for "no charge." 285 Lucas, the
defendant, produced and distributed diesel fuel-injection systems, as well
as technical literature explaining how to repair the systems. 28 6 The plaintiff
alleged that Lucas conditioned the availability of its technical literature
(the tying product) on its customers' agreeing to buy Lucas' fuel-injection
systems (the tied product). 287 i response, Lucas argued both that the
technical literature was not a "separate product" (because Lucas did not
"sell its technical literature to anyone but provide[d] the technical
information at no cost") 288 and that the coercion element was not met.289
The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that in light of Lucas' large
market share, it was reasonable to infer that Lucas was "using its control
over technical literature to force [customers] to purchase pumps and
parts. ,290
The Microsoft case presented the inverse situation: a positive-price
tying product and a zero-price tied product. One of the government's
theories of liability (successful at the trial level) was that Microsoft had
contractually and technologically tied its web browser to its dominant
OS. 2 91 The D.C. Circuit reversed the trial court's application of the
modified per se rule, holding that the novelty of both Microsoft's
challenged conduct and the relevant markets necessitated a rule-of-reason
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, defines a "sale" as "the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price." U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014) (emphasis
added). Courts have in other areas suggested a broader reading. E.g., Baum v. Astrazeneca LP, 605 F.
Supp. 2d 669, 677 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (observing, as to state employment law, that "[t]he precise
contours of a 'sale' naturally differ across industries, markets, and even cultures").
285. Lucas Indus. v. Kendiesel, Inc., No. 93-4480, 1995 WL 350050, at *4 (D.N.J. June 9, 1995).
286. Id. at *1.
287. Id. at *4. The challenged conduct could be analyzed as a hybrid tying-exclusive dealing
scheme: Lucas used its technical literature as the tying product and its fuel-injection systems as the
tied product, but it went a step further by requiring that its customers buy all their fuel-injection
systems from Lucas. See id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at *5.
290. Id.
291. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also John M.
Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 720-22
(2012) (analyzing Microsoft under the rubric of product-design conduct).
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analysis.292 The case was settled without a substantive ruling on the
government's tying claims. Yet-given that Microsoft enjoyed a share of
at least 80% (and perhaps more than 95%) in the OS market 293 and
essentially refused to license its OS to downstream customers unless they
also licensed its web browser 294-the coercion element may well have
been satisfied. The absence of a positive price charged for Microsoft's web
browser did not necessarily preclude the possibility of anticompetitive
harm. 295
Where a defendant has no economic interest relating to the zero-price
product, however, no liability should arise from an apparent "tying"
arrangement. Thus, for example, in Directory Sales Management Corp. v.
Ohio Bell Telephone Co., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
rejection of the claim that a telephone services provider illegally tied "free
296yellow pages listing[s]" to telephone services. Not only were businesses
allowed to refuse the free listings, but the defendant had no economic
interest in tying the two products together-it already enjoyed a monopoly
in the telephone services market, and it truly charged its services
subscribers nothing for the free listings.297 Similarly, in a case alleging that
a charitable organization had engaged in illegal tying, the Ninth Circuit
declined to find liability-the seller of the tying product had no economic
interest in the "tied" product (an examination form provided free of
charge). 298 A district court likewise rejected a claim predicated on a
television provider's "tying" the production of public service
announcements (PSAs), in part because the defendant's time spent
producing PSAs was charitably donated.2 99
292. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84.
293. Id. at 54.
294. Microsoft's licensing practices were more complicated than traditional tying arrangements-
rather than simply predicating the licensing of its OS on the licensing of its web browser, Microsoft
(for example) prohibited customers from removing the "desktop icons, folders, and Start menu entries"
for its web browser from its OS. Id. at 61.
295. As Bork explained, Microsoft "was earning supracompetitive returns on the monopoly it was
defending, while Netscape, forced to distribute its Navigator free, had no income in that market to
cover its fixed costs. Understandably, Netscape gave up a contest it could not win." Bork, supra note
143, at 55.
296. Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir. 1987).
297. Id. at 609-10. The defendant required the third-party phonebook publisher to provide the free
listings, apparently believing such listings served the public interest-the defendant was, at the time of
the agreement with the publisher, a subsidiary of AT&T before its breakup in 1984. Id. at 608.
298. See Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 704 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1983).
299. See Drake v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., No. 10-2671-JTM, 2011 WL 2680688, at *2 (D. Kan.
2011). Additionally, it is not clear that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant actually tied the PSAs to
any other "product." Id. at *4.
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C. Exclusive Dealing
Though precedent in the area is sparse, at least one U.S. court has
squarely confronted an exclusive-dealing claim involving a zero-price
market. In Feitelson v. Google, Inc., a putative class of consumers
challenged agreements allegedly made between Google, creator of the
popular Android mobile OS, and various mobile telephone manufacturers
(OEMs).3 00 According to the complaint, Google licensed the Android OS
to various OEMs "for free." 3 01 Google also allowed OEMs to "pre-load,"
free of charge, its popular applications (e.g., YouTube) onto mobile
302
telephones. The gravamen of the complaint was exclusive dealing:
Google required OEMs that pre-loaded Google applications to "also agree
to make Google the default search engine for all 'search access points' on
the device."30 3 The relevant markets were alleged to be the U.S. markets
for "general search" and "handheld general search." 3 04
The court held that the complaint failed to satisfactorily allege the
substantive elements required for a successful exclusive-dealing claim.
Specifically problematic was the plaintiffs' failure "to demonstrate
substantial foreclosure of competition in [the relevant] markets." 305 The
court reasoned that a 51.7% share of the U.S. smartphone OS market did
not support a finding of substantial foreclosure in the markets for "general
search" or "handheld general search," particularly given that the exclusive-
dealing arrangements affected only a subset of devices equipped with
Google's OS. 30 6 That said, at least as to the handheld general search
market, the court called its decision "a close call."307
The Feitelson court's focus on substantial foreclosure (or lack thereof)
in the relevant markets may have been misdirected. Google obtained
default search status, but it did not prevent OEMs from including other
search providers as alternative options. Thus, Google's conduct could be
viewed as merely obtaining preferential treatment from a downstream
customer. On this view, Google offered something of value-its popular
applications at zero prices-in exchange for an advantageous promotional
300. Feitelsony. Google, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
301. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, Feitelson v. Google, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 5:14-cv-02007-BLF).
302. Id.
303. Feitelson, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 (quoting First Amended Class Action Complaint at 13-14).
304. Id. (quoting First Amended Class Action Complaint at 9, 31).
305. Id. at 1031.
306. Id. at 1032.
307. Id.
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placement. Courts have routinely declined to condemn instances of
suppliers' giving incentives for preferential promotional treatment while
allowing rivals' products to remain available to consumers.3 08 So long as
the applications market was (or markets were) sufficiently competitive,3 09
such that Google's search rivals could offer similar benefits to OEMs in an
attempt to gain similar preferential promotional treatment (i.e., default
status), it is difficult to see any potential harm arising from the conduct
challenged by the plaintiffs in Feitelson.
In general, the Feitelson court was rightly skeptical of the plaintiffs'
pleadings,3 10 demanding greater factual rigor before exposing the
defendant to extensive discovery requirements. This skepticism is in
keeping with a healthy suspicion of claims involving exclusive dealing,
which-in zero-price contexts as in more traditional markets-often
carries with it procompetitive benefits.3 1 ' While its focus on the question
of substantial foreclosure in the relevant markets may have been
misplaced, the Feitelson court encouragingly did more than mere "hand
waving"3 12 when confronted by zero prices.
D. Predatory Pricing
In theory, though perhaps no longer in practice,3 13 a defendant can
violate the antitrust laws by predatory pricing. The modem standard
requires plaintiffs to satisfy two elements in order to make out a predatory-
308. See, e.g., El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 628-31 (S.D.
Tex. 2003); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362, 379-86 (M.D.N.C.
2002); Louisa Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813-16
(E.D. Ky. 1999).
309. For an argument that the relevant applications markets were not competitive, see Benjamin
Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 365, 390-91 (2015) (addressing Google's conduct under the rubric of tying).
310. Russia's Federal Anti-Monopoly Service ("FAMS") was not as skeptical of a similar
complaint filed by Yandex NV, then Russia's largest search engine, against Google-in September
2015, the FAMS ruled that Google's "requir[ing] equipment makers to pre-stall its services, including
search, to get the Google Play application store on their devices" violated Russia's antitrust laws. Ilya
Khrennikov, Russia Says Google Violated Antitrust Laws, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://antitrust.bna.com/atrc/7031/split display.adp?fedfid=75712154&vname=atdbulallissues&jd=a
h2r0t8b2&split=0.
311. See AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1810.
312. Compare Feitelson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019, with Evans, supra note 6, at72.
313. See Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix: Applying
Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615,
648 n.194 (2012) ("Since Matsushita was decided in 1986, no plaintiff, including the Department of
Justice, has succeeded in satisfying the two prong 'below cost + recoupment' standard.") (quoting
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 672, 699-700 (2d ed. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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pricing claim: (1) the defendant sold its product at prices below some
measure of its own cost, and (2) after rivals or potential entrants are
neutralized, the defendant is likely to recoup its losses in the form of
monopoly profits. Gal and Rubinfeld helpfully distinguish between two
types of predatory-pricing schemes involving zero prices: (1) "short-term
provision of free goods . . . based on a two-staged strategy in which the
price is raised and initial losses recouped once the threat of entry or
expansion is lifted"; and (2) "those [cases] in which the free product will
always be provided for free."314 The first, which allows a fairly
straightforward analysis using traditional antitrust principles, is well-
recognized as a potential violation.3 15 The second is less well-explored.
The most notable litigated case involving zero-price-related conduct
that "can be seen as a form of predatory pricing" is United States v.
Microsoft.3 16 Broadly speaking, Microsoft competed in both the OS market
(where its Windows OS held a dominant position) and the web browser
market (with its Internet Explorer, or "IE" browser). Though the
government did not pursue a predatory-pricing theory on appeal, it did so
at the trial-court level.3 17 One treatise observes that because "Microsoft
makes enough revenue from collateral sources-and the marginal cost of
another copy of the [IE] Web browser, especially in electronic form, is so
low-that its price does not seem predatory."3 18 Yet, the fact that the
marginal costs to Microsoft of producing and distributing copies of IE
were low does not preclude a predation scheme on its part. Microsoft still
needed to recoup the fixed costs of producing IE, which were high (well
over $100 million per year).3 19 And the first point (that Microsoft made
substantial revenue from related sources) may actually indicate, rather than
obviate, the possibility of predation. As Leslie points out, "Microsoft did
not recoup in the market in which the predation occurred-browsers-but
314. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 3.
315. See, e.g., id.; Gerald F. Hayden Jr., Predatory Pricing: The Combines Investigation Act-
Subsection 34(1)(c), a Violation in Search ofa Standard, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 546 (1983).
316. Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLuM. L. REV. 1695, 1722
(2013).
317. The Government alleged as much in its case against Microsoft. Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed
Findings of Fact, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 WL 1419040 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1999) (Civ.
Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ)), https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-proposed-findings-fact-2
("Microsoft set a zero price for its browser for the purpose of depriving Netscape of revenue and
protecting its operating system monopoly.").
318. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.5(b) (2015).
319. See Leslie, supra note 316, at 1722.
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it did recoup elsewhere." 320 Specifically, Microsoft was able to recoup its
IE-related losses in the complementary OS market.
The Microsoft facts illustrate an important point regarding antitrust
scrutiny of predatory-pricing in zero-price markets: ignoring the
interconnected way(s) in which suppliers profit from zero-price products
will yield faulty results. These errors may arise in three ways.
First, by failing to take into account the all-in "price" charged-which
may include information or attention costs-courts may wrongly find
below-cost pricing. Gal and Rubinfeld suggest that the below-cost pricing
''requirement is easily met with regard to free goods: zero is clearly below
cost."321 Under this view, the below-cost pricing requirement would
essentially be obviated in zero-price markets.322 To avoid such a result,
antitrust law should require proof of an all-in price that would include any
attendant information or attention costs, then determine whether that price
was set below the defendant's cost.323 This two-step analysis is necessary
because the recoupment element alone may not be enough to prevent false
positives. 3 24 Firms offering zero prices must always recoup their losses
somehow-but not in the sense contemplated by the predatory-pricing
recoupment requirement. Courts that have conclusorily found the below-
cost pricing element to be satisfied may well be overly quick to find
recoupment (in the predatory-pricing sense) given this inherent structural
feature of zero-price markets. To avoid false positives, satisfying the
320. Id.
321. Gal &Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 41.
322. On the Microsoft facts, the problem of underestimating price due to unrecognized
information or attention costs was not present-Microsoft did not profit via extracting information or
attention from users of its Internet browser.
323. In a state antitrust law case applying the federal predatory-pricing standard, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin espoused a somewhat similar requirement. There, the Court held that "advertising
revenue directly derived from increased circulation . .. must be considered when determining whether
below-cost pricing [to readers] occurred." Conley Publ'g. Grp. Ltd. v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 665
N.W.2d 879, 895 (Wis. 2003). Similarly, in a California unfair competition case, the court rejected a
plaintiff's argument that "the price [the defendant] charges to watch a video-zero-is less than what
it costs [the defendant] to maintain the video on its server." Cammarata v. Bright Imperial Ltd., No.
B218226, 2011 WL 227943, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. as last modified on denial of rehearing Feb. 24,
2011). Recognizing that the defendant profited via attention costs, the court concluded that if the
plaintiffs "subscription-based website lost revenue . . . it was because the [defendant's] business
model is more efficient, not because of alleged predatory pricing." Id. at *7. Finally, in a Maryland
antitrust case, the court rejected a plaintiffs claim that the defendant's offering "electronic
connectivity services" at zero prices to doctors constituted predatory pricing, where the defendant
charged positive (indeed, high) prices to insurance companies for access to the services. Martello v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., 795 A.2d 185, 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
324. Gal and Rubinfeld suggest, to the contrary, that "[a] requirement of potential recoupment, as
required in the U.S., solves this false positive problem." Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 43.
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below-cost pricing element as to zero-price products should require
calculation of an all-in price against which to measure cost. 32 5
Second, courts may wrongly overlook actual predation by failing to
take into account sources of profit that do not depend on charging a
positive price for the relevant product.326 Put another way, focusing the
recoupment analysis too narrowly in a zero-price market context may yield
the incorrect conclusion that recoupment is impossible-how could zero
prices yield monopoly profits? 3 27 Taking into account a defendant's
related, positive-price activity (e.g., Microsoft's selling OSs) provides the
(potential) answer.
Third, courts may overlook the possibility of a classically structured
predatory-pricing scheme that substitutes information or attention
overcharges for supracompetitive prices. As to other types of potentially
anticompetitive conduct, some analysts have made the mistake of turning a
blind eye to the exchanged nature of information and attention costs. 3 28
Yet a dominant firm could, at least in theory, establish low levels of
information or attention costs (e.g., by including no advertisements with
the relevant product) during a predation period, then raise cost levels to a
supracompetitive level (e.g., an onerous privacy policy or level of
advertisements) during a recoupment period. Avoiding false negatives
requires recognizing that attention or information often stand in for money
in zero-price markets.329
325. Of course, doing so will be difficult. Yet, given that plaintiffs have uniformly failed to prove
predatory-pricing claims after Matsushita, see supra note 313, even without the added complication of
calculating an all-in price, the objection seems purely academic. If it is already, in practice, impossible
to prove a predatory pricing violation, it would be a hollow objection to contend that the present
proposal will raise the bar even higher. The false-positive problems associated with declining to do so,
however, would not be subject to the same critique. It should also be noted that this discussion
assumes that the below-cost pricing requirement serves a useful purpose, a point not uniformly agreed
upon. See Leslie, supra note 316, at 1765 ("Predatory pricing can be anticompetitive and reduce
consumer welfare even in the absence of recoupment. This makes recoupment an inappropriate
element for an antitrust violation.").
326. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 43 ("[A] narrow application of the recoupment
requirement might create another set of errors: false negatives.").
327. As Wright and Mianne put it: "From the point of view of the buyers .... these monopolists
are really pathetic at extracting profits, as most of them give away their products for free."). Geoffrey
Maine & Joshua Wright, What's an Internet Monopolist? A Reply to Professor Wu, TRUTH ON MKT.
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/11/22/whats-an-internetmonopolist-a-reply-to-
professor-wu/ [http://perma.cc/L4UF-UC7K].
328. See Newman, supra note 3, at 190, 193-94 for examples.
329. See id. at 202; cf HOVENKMvIP ET AL., supra note 318, § 13.5(b) ("Alternatively,
[companies] may give away products (such as television or radio broadcasts or Internet services) in
exchange for the attention of their customers.").
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E. Refusals to Deal
Multiple antitrust investigations and lawsuits have involved possible
refusals to deal in zero-price markets. Certainly the most high-profile to
date have been the long-running, much-debated, multijurisdictional
inquiries into whether Google, Inc.'s search practices anticompetitively
favor its own vertically integrated services. Yet these inquiries are not
entirely unique; U.S. courts have also analyzed refusals to deal in other
zero-pnce contexts.
In Kinderstart.com, the plaintiff, Kinderstart, operated a specialized
search engine that provided "links to information and resources on
subjects related to young children."330 According to a complaint
Kinderstart filed against Google, Inc., Google engaged in various
anticompetitive strategies designed to harm competition, including a
refusal to deal: "the practice of 'Blockage' of websites by 'delisting, de-
indexing and censoring' websites"33 from the search results delivered to
Google's users. The court dismissed Kinderstart's complaint for various
defects. Though the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly required a
"prior voluntary course of dealing" as an element to bringing a successful
refusal-to-deal claim, lower courts, following the reasoning of Trinko,332
have generally adopted this element as a prophylactic gatekeeper.33 3 Thus,
as to the Kinderstart.com plaintiffs refusal-to-deal claim, the court
distinguished the facts alleged from those in Aspen Skiing Co. 334-unlike
the defendant in Aspen Skiing Co., Google had never voluntarily dealt with
Kinderstart.335
In LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., the plaintiff operated a social-
networking website (vidilife.com) that competed with defendant
MySpace's website.33 6 Allegedly, MySpace altered its website so as to
prevent its users from viewing or posting links to videos hosted at
330. Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 WL 3246596, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2006).
331. Id. at *3.
332. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
333. See, e.g., Am. Cent. E. Texas Gas Co. v. Union Pac. Res. Grp. Inc., 93 Fed. App'x. 1, 8 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) ("Courts admittedly must be cautious in finding exception to the right to
refuse to deal. However, the court notes that [defendant] refused to deal in the context of a prior course
of dealing with ACET.").
334. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
335. Kinderstart.comLLC, 2006 WL 3246596, at *10.
336. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff'd, 304 Fed. App'x. 554 (9th Cir. 2008).
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vidilife.com. 337 The plaintiff sued MySpace, claiming that such conduct
amounted to a refusal to deal in violation of Sherman Act § 2.338 i a
decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, the district court dismissed the
complaint. Again following the reasoning of Trinko, the Live Universe, Inc.
district court reasoned that MySpace's merely allowing its users to
reference other websites did not amount to a prior voluntary course of
dealing between MySpace and the plaintiff.339
Two years later, the court in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.,340
rejected a somewhat similar claim against social-network Facebook
(which had, by then, surpassed MySpace in terms of U.S.-based users).34 1
In Power Ventures, a rival alleged that Facebook anticompetitively
"prohibit[ed] its users from logging into Facebook through third-party
sites."3 42 The court dismissed the rival's antitrust counterclaim, rejecting
"the proposition that Facebook is somehow obligated to allow third-party
websites unfettered access to its own website simply because some other
third-party websites grant that privilege to Facebook."3 43 As in the
Kinderstart.com and Liveuniverse cases, no prior voluntary course of
dealing existed between the alleged monopolist (here, Facebook) and its
rival(s).
Taken together, these cases suggest that refusals to deal in zero-price
markets (as elsewhere) will likely be unsuccessful absent a prior direct
relationship between rivals.344 Thus, to take the example of the charges
leveled at Google, noted above, these cases suggest that-without more-
mere allegations that Google manipulated search results so as to favor its
own affiliate websites would likely not pass muster under U.S. antitrust
law. If, however, as a leaked FTC Staff Report suggested, such
manipulations occur following a direct, "long-established, voluntary, and
mutually beneficial"3 45 relationship between rivals, a rival alleging an
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at *13.
340. No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010).
341. JR Raphael, PCWORLD, Facebook Overtakes MySpace in U.S. (June 16, 2009, 3:35 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/166794/FacebookOvertakesMySpace-in US.html.
342. Power Ventures, 2010 WL 3291750, at *13.
343. Id.
344. See David Golden, Refusals to Deal in the Big Data Era, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 10:14
AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/589545/refusals-to-deal-in-the-big-data-era [perma.cc/X4L7-
K6QQ] (observing that "[n]o direct contractual relationship existed between Power Ventures and
Facebook").
345. See Memorandum to FED. TRADE COMM'N, SUBJECT: GOOGLE, INC. 88 (Aug. 8, 2012)
http://gmphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/img/ftc-ocr-watermark.pdf.
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anticompetitive refusal to deal would enjoy a relatively higher likelihood
of success in court.
F Mergers
Mergers and acquisitions affecting zero-price markets present unique
issues-and a cautionary tale. The most critical type of error made in this
arena to date, and thus the issue that the following discussion focuses on,
is that of false negatives: concluding that transactions are unlikely to harm
competition where such harm is, in fact, likely to occur.3 4 6 The most
certain way to make such errors is to fail even to consider a source of
potential harm, which some analysts have (unfortunately) done in the past
when confronted with transactions involving zero-price markets. By
failing to conceive of zero-price markets as such, analysts deprive
themselves of any chance to detect probable anticompetitive effects.
The likelihood of such failures appears to vary depending on the
particular zero-price strategies being employed by market participants.
Specifically, analysts appear more likely to recognize the possibility of
harm where freemium or complementary-products strategies are
employed.347 This is likely so because the relatively close nexus between
zero- and positive-price products in such markets makes them closer
analogues to traditional positive-price markets. Thus, for example, in
United States v. H & R Block, Inc. ,348 the government successfully
challenged the proposed acquisition of TaxACT by H & R Block. Prior to
its proposed acquisition, TaxACT had long employed a freemium strategy,
offering "free" basic "digital do-it-yourself (DDIY) federal tax return
preparation services in addition to positive-price "deluxe" editions and
state returns.349 Thus, there was a close nexus between TaxACT's zero-
and positive-price products.350 Competitors followed suit, and offering
some combination of "free" and paid DD1Y services become the industry
norm.351' Having defined the relevant market so as to include both positive-
and zero-price DD1Y products, the court concluded that the proposed
346. See Newman, supra note 3, at 193.
347. For an explanation of the three primary types of sustainable zero-price business models, see
Newman, supra note 3, at 154-57.
348. 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
349. Id. at 43, 46.
350. See id. at 88 ("[B]ecause free DDIY products [were] often packaged with other paid
products, these 'free' products actually provide[d] the companies with a positive average revenue per
free unit.").
351. Id. at 48 ("Today, free offers in various forms are an entrenched part of the ... market.").
108 [VOL. 94:49
ANTITRUST IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS
transaction would likely lessen competition in that market.3 5 2 Among other
potential sources of harm, the court held that the transaction would have
reduced head-to-head competition-including price and quality
competition involving "free" products-between the defendants.35
Analysts appear less likely to recognize the possibility of harm where
zero prices are charged to customers on one side of a multi-sided market.
The temptation is to focus solely on potential harm to customers on the
positive-price side of the market, ignoring nonmonetary harm to customers
on the zero-price side. For example, in the late 1990s, deregulation of the
broadcast-radio industry led to a massive wave of mergers and
acquisitions, many of them reviewable by DOJ.35 4 DOJ's analyses of both
market definition and market power addressed solely prices to advertisers;
DOJ did not consider potential harm to listeners.355 Yet, recent empirical
research suggests such harm did occur, in the form of greater attention
costs (i.e., a higher ratio of advertisements to content), in many markets.356
The problem of such false negatives is substantial, and may well be
increasing in magnitude along with the general proliferation of zero-price
products. Multiple recent high-profile mergers have involved zero-price
products, including (perhaps most notably) the Facebook-Instagram
acquisition. When Facebook's $1 billion acquisition of Instagram (a
company with zero revenue and only a handful of employees) was
announced, industry observers almost immediately identified eliminating
competition as the probable incentive for the deal. 35 7 The two firms
offered what were likely the two zero-price photo-sharing social networks
most popular among consumers-yet the FTC unanimously cleared the
acquisition.358 Since the FTC offered no guidance as to its decision, it is
352. Id. at 45.
353. Id. at 85.
354. For an extended discussion of this history, see Newman, supra note 3, at 190-93; see also
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media Is a Bad Idea, 105
Nw. U. L. REv. 1399, 1411-15 (2011).
355. See Joel I. Klein, Acting Ass't Atty Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, Speech at the ANA
Hotel: DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers 7-19 (Feb. 19, 1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/1055.pdf.
356. See Mooney, supra note 52, at 19.
357. See, e.g., Om Malik, Here Is Why Facebook Bought Instagram, GIGAOM (Apr. 9, 2012,
11:28 AM), https://gigaom.com/2012/04/09/here-is-why-did-facebook-bought-instagram/ [https://perma.
cc/6BKA-MTWC] ("Facebook was scared shitless and knew that for the first time in its life it arguably
had a competitor that could not only eat its lunch, but also destroy its future prospects. Why? Because
Facebook is essentially about photos.").
358. Alexei Oreskovic, FTC Clears Facebook's Acquisition of Instagram, REUTERS (Aug. 22,
2012, 8:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/23/us-facebook-instagram-idUSBRE87L14
W20120823.
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impossible to know whether the agency adequately evaluated potential
anticompetitive harm to users (not just to advertisers). But, if FTC
followed the lead set by DOJ in the broadcast-radio context, it may have
ignored a source of potential harm.
Merger analyses must include scrutiny of the zero-price side of
multisided platforms. The demand curves exhibited by customers on one
side of a platform (e.g., advertisers) can be quite different than those
exhibited by customers on the other side (e.g., consumers).35 9 To take an
example, suppose that the candidate relevant market is "organic search,"
that the market is dominated by three large firms, and that the two largest
firms have proposed a merger. The prevailing business model used by
online search providers is two-sided.360 Providers charge zero prices (but
attention costs) to users and positive prices to advertisers.
Advertisers may view search results and, for example, online email
services as close substitutes: both are means of delivering ads to
consumers. As a result, at least one court has held that "search-based
advertising is reasonably interchangeable with other forms of Internet
advertising."3 6 1 In fact, advertisers may even view offline venues like
billboards as fairly close substitutes for online platforms.3 6 2 To a user,
however, social networks and email services may not be as closely
substitutable, and billboards are so distant as to be irrelevant. In such a
359. Empirical analysis of programming conducted in the wake of deregulation shows that the
advertising time increases as firm size increases (i.e., as market concentration increases); tellingly, the
amount of time devoted to advertisements increases most sharply during times of the day when
listeners have fewer ready substitutes. Mooney, supra note 52, at 2.
360. See James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine
Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
517, 518 (2014) ("[W]e discuss and describe Google's business model, which is primarily a two-sided
platform to sell advertising."). Ratliff & Rubinfeld conclude that because "feedback effects" link the
two sides of search platforms, the relevant market is "at least as broad as a two-sided search-
advertising market." Id. at 519. Their conclusion relies heavily on the fact that Google could not
profitably provide organic search results without also selling advertising. Id. at 536. Yet a similar
observation could be made about any business. Take, for example, a grocery store: the store could not
profitably purchase food without also selling it. The bare fact that a given competitive practice is
related to, or even necessary for, competition in a different area does not compel a single antitrust
market. Where, as with search, the two sides of a platform exhibit different demand curves, it seems
appropriate to follow the American Express Co. court in reasoning that the two-though "deeply
interrelated"-may constitute separate markets. See supra note 97.
361. Personv. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1831111, at*3 (N.D. Cal. June 25,
2007).
362. As Waller points out, "[i]t is an open question whether online advertising is even a separate
relevant market from its offline alternatives." Waller, supra note 90, at 1782. Goldfarb and Tucker find
that "online display advertising is a substitute for offline display (primarily billboard) advertising."
Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Advertising Bans and the Substitutability of Online and Offline
Advertising, 48 J. MKTG RESEARCH 207, 208 (2011).
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scenario, advertisers may exhibit relatively elastic demand, meaning they
could easily substitute away to defeat a price increase by the merged firm.
Yet consumers may exhibit relatively inelastic demand, meaning they are
more likely to be harmed by attention- or information-cost overcharges
imposed by the merged firm as an exercise of the post-merger increase in
its market power.
Focusing solely on potential harm to positive-price customers (in the
above example, advertisers) thus not only overlooks one source of
potential harm-it overlooks the most likely source of potential harm. As
a general matter, ignoring harm to zero-price customers has caused and,
unless the practice is stopped, will continue to cause harm to competition
and consumer welfare.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law and economics understandably depend heavily on the
presence of positive prices. Products are, however, increasingly being
offered in exchange for customers' attention and information instead of
their money. The antitrust enterprise finds itself confronted with
fundamental questions about its own role and efficacy in these markets.
And, at least in their current state, many of the standard tools used by
modem antitrust analysts will be difficult or impossible to use in the
presence of zero prices.
Yet the framework underlying such tools often proves to be "supple
enough"3 63 for use in zero-price markets. Moreover, while some of the
extant case law gives reason for concern, at least a few courts have
squarely confronted the unique issues presented by zero prices. Those
courts have not always done so perfectly, but they have at least tentatively
begun the process of modernization. That process is of vital, and growing,
importance. For antitrust law to play its congressionally mandated role of
safeguarding competition, it must continue to adapt and evolve in the face
of zero-price markets.
363. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925 (2001)
(arguing that the antitrust enterprise is "supple enough, and its commitment to economic rationality
strong enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by the new economy").
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